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ABSTRACT
The Internationalization of Emerging Market Multinationals:
Effects of Host and Home Country Institutional Factors
by
ZHANG Yuanyuan
Master of Philosophy
As we all know, economic globalization and internationalization have sparked
off countless studies and arguments in the past years. Some of the conventional
theories about the internationalization of firms, however, are repeatedly challenged
when they are applied to the less developed countries. The internationalization of
firms from less developed countries has been a topic of growing interest in the
international business and economics literature. In our study, we consider the
influence of institutions from both the host and home country on entry modes of
Chinese firms expanding overseas. Based on a sample of 314 China’s MNCs, the
results support our hypotheses that both home and host institutions have significant
effects on entry modes. Meanwhile, there are significant interactions between
institutional quality of the host country and the government support of the home
country and ownership type. At last, we find that both home and host institutional
factors also affect the entry mode for a certain investment type, especially for the
R&D investment. These findings have meaningful implications for understanding the
internationalization behaviors of Chinese firms and the effect of dual institutional
factors in studying the foreign entry modes of MNCs.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Problem Definition
As we all know, economic globalization and internationalization have
sparked off numerous studies and arguments in the past years. The leading
theories of internationalization covered different perspectives such as Economics
(Dunning 1988 & 2001, Coase 1937, Vernon 1966 & 1979), Knowledge
Development (Johanson & Vahlne 1977, Luostarinen 1979) and Organization
Learning (Kogut 1988). Some of them, however, are repeatedly challenged when
they are applied to the less developed countries. The internationalization of less
developed countries has been a topic of continuous interest in the international
business and economics literature.
Many studies focused on the role of home government in supporting the
emergence of outward activities from less developed countries (Korhonen and
Luostarinen and Welch, 1996; Child and Rodrigues, 2005). Even though some
studies touched upon the relationship between inward and outward activities and
technology transfer in the internationalization process (Lall 1983, Cantwell 1989),
those studies mainly emphasized the technology learning and accumulation for
the less developed countries, without explaining the reason for various modes
and location choice of their outward investment.
Our study argues that the modes and location choice of China’s outward
investment can be explained in perspective of both home and host institutional
1

factors and the interactions between them. Our findings will not only shed new
light on the modes and location choice of outward investment from less
developed countries, but also contribute to the empirical studies of outward
internationalization in the perspective of institutional factors which may provide
better explanations for foreign entry modes of LDCs in addition to the traditional
internationalization theories.
1.2 Rationale
As one of the developing countries, China is a latecomer in the international
market. Prior to 2000, Chinese firms lack advanced technologies, managerial
experience and marketing skills. With China poised to become the second largest
economy in the world, however, more firms from Chinese mainland have
become formidable players in the world marketplace. In 2008 alone, China’s
outward FDI reached US $52 billion. The internationalization of Chinese firms
has attracted the attention of researchers from various fields.
Also, prior to 2003, Chinese outward investment was largely from the
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Private firms were then legally prohibited from
investing abroad. Thus, many studies focused on the role of the government
when doing research on internationalization of Chinese firms. After 2003, many
private Chinese firms have expanded aggressively overseas in search of market
opportunities, such as Haier, TCL, Huawei and Lenovo. As more and more
Chinese firms become internationalized and move into the global marketplace,
the outward internationalization of Chinese firms has become a topic of intense
2

interest in international business.
Moreover, although the existing studies have examined the role of
institutions in constraining MNCs' investment behavior, these institutions are
mostly unilateral and involve just one country, i.e., the host country. Since the
investment behavior of MNEs involves both home country and host country
factors, it is necessary to examine the internationalization behavior of firms
under the influence of dual institutions (Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992).
At last, the extant literature on entry mode neglects the role of investment
types, which may also have great effects on the decision making of entry mode.
Investment types, such as R&D, market-seeking or manufacturing operations are
also closely related to the institution factors (AI-Saadon & Das, 1996; Mansfield,
1995). For example, R&D intensity is an important contingency factor that
influences FDI decisions (Han, 2002; Lee, 1985). Institutional quality as the level
of intellectual property protection in the host country is a very important
institutional factor for favoring wholly owned subsidiary (WOS) as an entry
mode for R&D investment. Consequently, entry mode decisions may be affected
by both institutional factors and investment types. This study will explore the
influences of institutional factors and their interactions with investment types on
entry mode choices.
1.3 Research Objectives
Based on traditional transaction cost theory, our study extends extant
internationalization literature by integrating institutional theory and exploring the
3

effects of institutions of both host and home countries on the entry mode
decisions of EMMNCs.
For the first part, we consider the main effect of dual institutions on entry
modes. Then we explore the interaction effect between those institutional factors
by examining how both home and host country institutions jointly affect MNCs’
entry mode decisions between equity modes and non-equity modes (FDI vs.
Export) when investing overseas. For the second part, we further integrate the
investment type and try to explore the influences of institutional factors and their
interactions with investment types on entry mode choices. We first examine the
main effects of investment types on entry modes, and then explore the
interactions of institutions and investment types. The key objective of this study
is to adopt the institutional theory to explain the entry modes of MNCs from less
developed countries, which can not be well explained by the traditional theories.
This research adopts the quantitative study method for empirical analyses.
The results based on a survey of 314 China’s MNCs support our hypotheses that
both home and host institutions have significant effects on entry modes.
Meanwhile, there are significant interactions between institutional quality of the
host country and the government support of the home country and ownership
type. At last, we find that both home and host institutional factors also have
effects on the entry modes for a certain investment type, especially for the R&D
investment. These findings have meaningful implications for understanding the
internationalization behaviors of Chinese firms and the effect of dual institutional
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factors in studying the foreign entry modes of EMMNCs.
1.4 Organization of the Thesis
This thesis is organized as follow: In chapter 2, theories about
internationalization of firms are introduced, including transaction cost theory,
OLI theory, IPLC theory, Process Theory, Other Behavioral Theories and
institutional theory. We furnish a brief review of the literature on those extant
popular theories and elaborate the research gap. In Chapter 3, we propose
hypotheses on the entry modes choice based on institutional theories and
investment types. In the first part, we focus on the effect of institutional factors
and the interaction effect between them on the entry mode choice between FDI
and export. In the second part, we integrate investment types and explore the
effect of institutional factors on entry mode choice between WOS and JV in a
certain investment type. Research methods are described in Chapter 4. The
results of hypothesis testing are presented in Chapter 5. Lastly, in Chapter 6, we
draw theoretical as well as managerial insights form the results and explore the
implications for the role of institutional theory in the internationalization of firms
from less developed economies and the direction for future research.

5

CHAPTER 2.

LITERATURE REVIEW

In this section, the definitions of internationalization of firms are reviewed
first. Then, the traditional theories of internationalization process of firms are
discussed. Third, it is followed by a discussion of the internationalization of
firms in less developed countries. At last, this section analyzes the
internationalization of firms in China. In the literature review, we point out the
limitations of some traditional theories and emphasize the importance of
institutional factors for examining the internationalization of firms in China.
2.1 Definition of Internationalization
The internationalization of firms has been captured by different terms such
as multinational corporations, transnational enterprises, and more recently global
companies. Researchers have defined internationalization from different
perspectives.
From an outcome perspective, some researchers use “foreign sales as a
percentage of total sales” as criteria of internationalization of firms (Stopford and
Dunning, 1983). The multidimensional measure of internationalization focus on
five characteristics of firms: 1) having manufacturing operations in multiple
regions/countries, 2) integration of resources globally, 3) leading product quality,
4) world-class R&D capability, 5) well-known brand in the world market
(Morgan and Katsikeas, 1997). Both the two definitions are suitable in this study
since they focus on results of internationalization, but the former is more
6

objective and the later is based on the subjective perspective.
From the process perspective, internationalization is frequently described as
“…..the outward movement of a firm’s international operation” (Johanson and
Vahlne, 1997; Johanson and Wedersheim-Paul, 1975; Luostarinen, 1979).
Previous researchers divided the entry mode for the outward movement to new
foreign markets into two ways: exporting (directly or through independent
channels), and foreign direct investment (FDI) (joint ventures, acquisitions,
mergers, and wholly owned new ventures). Entry modes vary in the degree of
control that a firm has over invested tangible and intangible assets. Therefore,
according to the concepts of international product life cycle and organization life
cycle, internationalization is also considered to be a gradual, sequential process
through different stages.
2.2 The Leading Theories for Internationalization of Firms
Transaction Cost Theory
Classical economics claimed that due to the perfect competition in market,
price mechanism may lead to the optimum allocation of the resources.
Transaction cost theory originated from Coase (1937). He did not explain the
firm behavior in the perspective of production function, rather claiming that firm
dependency and market dependency are two different strategies, which one is
preferred when the transaction cost is lower. Transaction cost arises when MNCs
are more efficient than markets and contracts in organizing interdependencies
between agents located in different countries. It includes the searching cost,
bargaining cost, contract cost, supervision cost and default cost (Coase, 1937).
7

Since it always claims that transaction cost generally refers to all the costs
caused by transactions, it is difficult to obtain a specified classification for
different kinds of transaction cost. Williamson (1975) classified the transaction
cost into: searching cost, information cost, bargaining cost, decision cost,
supervision cost and default cost. Williamson (1985) further divided transaction
cost into “ex ante” cost (contract cost, negotiation cost and monitoring cost etc)
and “ex post” cost (adjusting cost, bargaining cost, construction cost and
restriction cost). Dahlman (1979) classified the transaction cost in specified
categories in Table 1.
When there is interaction between the individuals and transaction
environments, the market failures may happen to due to the rise of transaction
barriers, which lead to the transaction cost. Referring to the sources of the
transaction cost, Williamson (1975) also suggested six sources of transaction
costs, including bounded rationality, opportunism, uncertainty and complexity,
small numbers, information asymmetric and atmosphere. Those six sources of
transaction cost originate from asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency of
transactions. (Williamson, 1985)
One of the most important issues of internationalization concerns the reason
for firms to choose a suitable entry mode in a foreign market. Several theories
have been put forward to explain the entry modes choice of firms. The
transaction cost theory posits that in choosing entry modes, firms make trade-offs
between control (or the level of integration) and cost of resource commitment.
On one hand, control is the focus of the entry mode literature because it is the
single most important determinant of both risk and return. To take control, the
entrant must assume responsibility for decision-making, responsibility a firm
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may be unwilling or unable to carry out in uncertain foreign environment
(Anderson and Gatignon, 1986). Control also entails commitment of resources,
including high overhead. Therefore, when entering into an uncertain foreign
market, high-control modes may increase return and risk while low-control
modes (e.g., licenses and other contractual agreements) minimize resource
commitment (hence risk) but often at the expense of returns. The argument above
is often under conditions of considerable risk and uncertainty, particularly in
lesser-known foreign markets.

Table 1: Transaction Cost Categories
Cost Categories

Cost Contents
ex ante cost

Search costs

Negotiation costs

Project documentation costs

The cost for searching for the available
information and services
Includes those costs incurred in the
preparation of the project design
document
that also documents
assignment and scheduling of benefits
over the project time period. It also
includes public consultation with key
stakeholders
Development of a baseline and
monitoring plan
ex post cost

Monitoring costs

Costs to collect data
Includes costs of administrative and
legal measures incurred in the event of
departure from the agreed transactions

Enforcement costs
Transfer costs

Brokerage costs

Source: Dahlman, 1979

Moreover, the mode choice may also be influenced by the level of
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firm-specific technology (asset specificity), since firms with greater technology
may incur higher transaction costs in safeguarding their technology from
misappropriation (Hennart, 1991; Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Williamson,
1985; Brouthers, 2010). Asset specificity refers to those assets that lose value in
alternative use (Williamson, 1985). To safeguard specific assets from potential
opportunism problems, firms may adopt high control modes (e.g., wholly owned
subsidiary) (Gatignon and Anderson 1988, Hennart, 1991; Makino and Neupert,
2000). Firms with less specific asset may be less concerned with opportunism
and more concerned with mode efficiency (Brouthers, 2010). Therefore,
transaction cost theory also suggests that firms holding high specific asset tend to
choose the modes with high control rights while firms holding low specific asset
tend to choose modes with low control rights.
Many previous studies use TCA (Transaction Cost Analysis) and
internalization theory to explain the internationalization behaviors (Reid 1983,
Saul, Gary and Victor 1990, Buckley 1988, Horaguchi and Toyne 1990). There
remain some limitations for those two theories. Dow (1987) argues that it is
inconsistent to invoke bounded rationality as a necessary assumption in the
analysis of contracts and governance structures, and then assume that
substantively rational choices can be made with respect to the contracts and
governance structures (that are imperfect because of bounded rationality). On the
other hand, transaction cost theory is more based on the developed countries that
hold certain specific assets or technology advantages. Thus, when explaining the

10

influence of specific asset on the entry mode choice, it is hard to explain why
some less developed countries which do not hold the specific assets remain to
take the mode with more control rights (e.g. wholly owned subsidiary). Moreover,
follow the transaction theory, transaction costs tend to be low in highly
competitive markets, thereby providing little or no incentive to substitute internal
organization for market exchange. It fails to explain the internationalization of
firms from lowly competitive markets and high transaction cost. At last, follow
the internalization theory, when faced with an inability of markets to impose
behavioral constraints and enforce simple contracts, firms are expected to
internalize transactions to reduce costs of exchange. It overemphasizes that the
internal system always has high efficiency than the external market and neglect
the fact that internalization is not almighty in any circumstances.

OLI Theory
Eclectic Paradigm theory by Dunning (1988) suggests that firms taking
appropriate outward activities should be based on the three factors they own:
ownership (O), location (L) and internalization (I) advantage. Since the 1960s,
International Production Theory could be divided by Industrial Organization
Theory, Firm Theory and Financial Theory. However, Dunning argued those
theories could not explain the international production behavior comprehensively.
Based on those three theories above, and combined with the Location Theory, he
suggested the OLI (Ownership-Location-Internalization) Model. In fact, OLI
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theory is consistent with Transaction Cost theory in a certain extent, but more
comprehensive.
The O-advantages refer to firms that have the economic advantages and hold
the characteristics and capabilities that other competitors lack. Dunning (1993)
identified two kinds of ownership advantage, asset advantage and transaction
cost minimizing advantages, which arise from the availability of human,
knowledge and physical capital as well as specific intangible related

to

property rights, marketing, organization, information processing, learning,
managerial skills, governance and trust, finance, experience with foreign market,
etc. The latter advantage was more emphasized.
The L-advantages are the attractions of comparative advantages for the
policies and investment environment in the place of production, including the
geographical position, relative price of the production factors, current and
potential market demand, transportation and communication cost, infrastructure,
government intervention, culture distance, etc. (Terpstra and Yu, 1988; Agarwal
and Ramaswami, 1992,Root, 1987,Brouthers et al., 1996) . Dunning (1988)
suggested when the host countries have large location advantages, they would
like to choose the entry modes into foreign markets. L-advantages not only affect
the firms’ internationalization tendency, but also have influence on the foreign
direct investment sectors and international production categories.
The I-advantages refer to firms that keep the advantages inside of the firms
to avoid the adverse effect of imperfect market. The incomplete outside market
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includes the structural incompleteness as competitive barrier and government
intervention, and nature incompleteness as information asymmetry and high
transaction cost. Firms can gain the maximum benefit through internalization if
they lose the ownership advantages caused by the market incompleteness.
The Eclectic Paradigm above discussed the influences of these three kinds of
advantages on the firms’ outward activities. The different combination of these
advantages will have a different effect on the firms’ foreign market entry mode.
(Table 2)

Table 2: Foreign Market Entry Mode
Categories of advantages
Ownership

Internalization

Location

advantages

advantages

advantages

Form of

Licensing

Yes

No

No

market

Export

Yes

Yes

No

entry

FDI

Yes

Yes

Yes

Source: Dunning, 1981.

Until now, OLI theory is remains to be one of the most comprehensive
theories to explain the international expansion of firms. It not only discusses the
effect factor for international production, but also explains all outward activities
of the firms. This approach attempts to analyze who, where and why of foreign
direct investment (FDI) activities in term of OLI advantages and has dominated
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international business research for the last two decades. Especially, the location
advantages provide more explanatory power for the effect of firm-specific factors
on the entry mode choice.
However, as this theoretical perspective is based on the transaction cost
considerations and emphasizes the firm-specific advantages (FSAs) s largely
related to Western MNCs in the internationalization process. OLI theory has
some common limitations similar to those of the transaction cost theory. It is
more based on the developed countries and fails to explain the outward activities
of the countries which do not hold those advantages. Although it is generally
regarded as a complementary theory; there are some overlaps for the
explanations of those three advantages. At last, OLI theory fails to explain the
case that firms from less developed countries expand into overseas market just in
order to acquire particular resources that they do not have.

IPLCTheory
International product life cycle theory was originally provided by Vernon
(1966), emphasized the role of “innovation, scale, ignorance, and uncertainty”
and discarded the classical assumption that knowledge is a free good. It
suggested three stages for the product development in the world market: (1)
Location of new products: a new product is developed in an advanced country, as
U.S. (2) Maturing: as the development, the production begins to extend to some
developed countries to seize the market in those countries. (3)Standardization:
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the production becomes standardized and the product is produced in more
developed countries, advanced country becomes the importing country soon.
At the very beginning, the production is located in the innovative country.
When a product becomes mature, its degree of standardization and consequently
of price elasticity of demand increases; production and transaction cost become
more and more important and the production will move to other developed
countries.
According to Vernon’s theory, Wells (1968) provide an international trade
cycle which could be divided into four stages:
(1) Innovation and U.S. export strength.
(2) Foreign production starts, U.S. grab most foreign markets.
(3) Foreign production competitive in export markets
(4) Import competition begins.
At the first stage, even though there are many reasons for the U.S.
entrepreneurs to produce in foreign countries, they still prefer to start
manufacturing at home to be close to the market for translating demands for
products design changes into more suitable ones and better communication with
specialized suppliers. During the second stage, as income and product familiarity
abroad increase, foreign producers begin to manufacture similar products. Even
U.S. exports still supply most of the world’s markets, they will decline gradually.
At the third stage, foreign goods become competitive and will gradually take
over the markets abroad which were previously held by American exports.

15

Finally, as the foreign manufacturers reach mass production, U.S. will face
severe import competition.
As the acceleration of information flow and the change in the national
markets of advanced industrialized countries, Vernon (1979) redefined the
hypotheses to explain the international trade in terms of the product cycle. It
classified multinational companies in to three ideal types and sought to explore
their likely behavior. The product life cycle is reconsidered to a certain extent
and weakens the explanatory power for the international behaviors of some
firms.
Except for various empirical test (Vernon1967, Mousouris 1972, Ayal and
Igal 1981, Almor, Hashai and Hirsch 2006), there are also some supplementary
studies for IPLC theory, Tsurumi(1977) emphasized the role of country market
for the product life cycle. The innovative country makes production in order to
satisfy the demand in their domestic market with high income at first, then move
to other developed countries market which there is an increasing desire for the
new products. And the other developed countries will modify the products to
adapt for their own markets, eventfully compete with the innovative country for
both the domestic and foreign markets.
In summary, the IPLC model suggests that many products go through a cycle
during which high-income, mass-consumption countries initially export products.
As development of the products, those countries eventually lose their export
markets and become importers of those same products (Vambery, Robert and Yun,
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1993). The standardized technique of production is key factor to the
internationalization of firms from the IPLC perspective and the innovation of a
new product is emphasized at the first phase of the cycle.
Therefore, IPLC theory does not quite match the situation in some less
developed countries, which would import the products and learn the technology
from other countries at the very beginning. The emphasis on the product
development and standardization would be the key limitation of the application
of IPLC theory in less developed countries. On the other hand, IPLC theory can
not explain the influence of the technology innovation in some new economic
fields (such as information technology) on the internationalization strategy of
firms.

The Process Theory and Other Behavioral Theories
Transaction cost theory and internalization theory do not regard the firm
internationalization behavior as a gradual process since they believe the firm may
not have distinct advantages of scale in different time period. There is, however,
another internationalization theory so-called process theory or the knowledge
development theory, which suggests that internationalization is an incremental
process.
The internationalization process theory is of Nordic origin, being formalized
and popularized by Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975) and Johanson and
Valhne (1977). This theory is based on the research of organization behavior and
treats firm internationalization as a gradually improved process. Firms increase
the resources investment step by step in the whole developing process and
17

improve the information controllability in the foreign markets.
It is also believed that internationalization is the product of a series of
incremental decisions. In this incremental process, manager’s gradual
accumulation of experimental knowledge of foreign market reduces the “psychic
distance (a set of factors preventing or disturbing the information flows between
firms and foreign markets, such as language, culture, political system, level of
education, and the level of industrial development)” (Johanson and Valhne,
1977).
In brief, firms start with no regular export activities, begin to export via
agents, and then establish their own foreign sales subsidiaries, and finally move
to production by investing in foreign countries. According to the theory, firms
expand internationally through various stages: from low risk, low-commitment
mode of entry -- direct exporting -- to high risk, high-commitment modes of
entry -- foreign sales and manufacturing subsidiaries (Johanson and
Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975).
Other perspectives on firms' internationalization include the adaptation of
organization

learning

theory

and

the

resource-based

view

in

the

internationalization context. Organizational learning theory explains the
incremental process of knowledge development (Szulanski 1996). Organizations
not only hold specialized knowledge, but also have the opportunity to learn from
other organizations. However, even though the knowledge is available,
organizations may not be able to access such knowledge, because they may not
have the same capability of learning to absorb and apply it for its own use.
Difference in their absorptive capabilities then explains the probability of local
firms to develop knowledge of international business (Tsang 1999).
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While previous research on the internationalization of firms has focused on
the outward activities: exporting or setting up oversea subsidiaries, several
researchers recognize that there is clearly an equivalent process of inward
activities as multinational firms engage in foreign sourcing activities (Korhonen
&Luostarinen & Welch 1996). These researchers emphasize that inward activities
play a key role in the process of knowledge development and resource
acquisition

among

local

firms

and

greatly

affect

their

outward

internationalization (Welch & Luostarinen 1993). They suggest that domestic
firms can begin the knowledge development process by engaging in inward
activities, such as becoming a distributor of foreign products or forming a joint
venture (JV) with a foreign company (Bjorkman and Kock 1995). Firms may
also be integrated into the global economy through inward internationalization or
up-stream internationalization. The inward internationalization process is very
relevant for multinationals from less developed economies, where firms often
begin their initial contact with the international markets by being a customer,
supplier, or distributor for multinationals from advanced economies.
Advocates of the process theory contend that acquisition of knowledge about
foreign markets allows the firm to enhance its learning abilities, reduce the
uncertainty and risk often associated with international business, and improve its
competitive position (Robock and Simmonds 1989, Autio et al 2000). And also
some previous studies conducted an empirical test of this theory and foundt that
process development theory is mainly applicable to the internationalization
behavior in small and medium-sized enterprises (Bilkey & Tesar，1977；Johanson
and Nonaka,1983; Ali & Camp,1993).
However, the basic assumption of this theory was challenged by some

19

previous studies. (Oviatt and Mcdougall， 1994； Schrader et al， 2000；Autio
and Sapienza，2000) The main criticism is that process theory emphasizes
internationalization become at the later stage of the organization growth process.
It fails to explain some firms which the outward activities take place during the
venture creation process or in the early stage of venture growth. On the other
hand, it fails to explain the leapfrogging of certain stages by internationalizing
firms.

Institutional Theory
Institutions can be defined as humanly devised constraints that structure
political, economic and social interactions (North, 1990). Levchenko (2007)
claimed that institutions typically refer to a wide range of structures that affect
economic outcomes: contract enforcement, property rights, investor protection,
the political system, and the like.
Scott (2001) argues that there are three pillars of institutions: the regulative,
the normative, and the cognitive. Regulative or the legal aspect of institutions
commonly takes the form of laws and regulations. They guide the actions and
perspectives of organizations or firms by the threat of legal sanctions. For
example, corporations adopt new pollution control technologies to conform to
environmental regulations, and nonprofit organizations maintain accounts and
hire accountants in order to meet tax law requirements (DiMaggio & Powell,
1983). Normative or the social aspect of institutions generally take the form of
rules-of –thumb, standard operating procedures, occupational standards and
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educational curricula. This aspect guides the actions and perspectives of
organizations or firms by social obligation or professionalization. Cognitive or
the cultural aspect includes symbols-words, signs, and gestures as well as
cultural rules and frameworks. Cognitive institutional aspect forms a culturally
supported and conceptually correct basis of legitimacy which may not be
questioned. For example, it is regarded as natural that environmental activists
pursue idealistic or collectivist interests, whereas corporations pursuer economic
and materialistic goals (Hoffman, 1999).
While the conventional firm-specific factors have been criticized for offering
a narrow view of organizational activities and only focusing on the technical
environments of individual transactions, there is a greater need to take the
country-specific factors into consideration based on a boarder institutional
environment. Institutions are shared, collective understandings or rules of
conduct reflected in laws, rules, governance mechanisms, and capital markets
(DiMaggio & Powell 1991; North 1990). Institutional factors include elements in
the technical environment as well as cognitive and sociological elements, such as
norms, standards, and expectations shared by relevant members. Each
organization is embedded in both its own internal institutional environment,
which consists of the structures, systems and practices established in the past as
well as its external institutional environment.
Until now, most studies of institutional factors have focused on the attributes
of the host countries in the internationalization process and have largely
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neglected the role of the home country institutional factors. While the
institutional quality and investment incentives of the host country can help attract
foreign investors, institutional factors from the home country such as government
support and ownership type of firms may also affect their internationalization
behaviors, especially for those firms from emerging market economies such as
China (Peng et al. 2008). This study takes into account both of the host country
and home country institutional factors and also their interactive effects on the
foreign market entry modes of EMMNCs.
Institutional theory provides a new perspective of ownership strategy for
foreign expansion. The traditional theories on internationalization tend to view
the difference between wholly owned and shared ownership as a matter of the
alignment of control rights between partners (Makino and Beamish 1998).
Institutional theory suggests ownership may be a means of conformity to the
institutional environment. When firms expand overseas, they face a dual pressure
of conformity: to the national environment of the host country, and to the
organization al practices within the multinational enterprise (Rosenzweig and
Singh 1991).
Yiu and Makino (2002) argued that institutional theory differs from
transaction cost theory in at least two important areas. First it pays more attention
to contextual variations in institutional environments. Even transaction cost
theory has mentioned some institutional constraints in their models (Williamson
1991), their focus has been limited to certain aspects of regulative institutions,
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and the normative and cognitive domains of the institutional environment are
mentioned comparably less (Roberts and Greenwood 1997). Second, key
determinants considered to have an impact on the choice of organizational
structure differ between transaction cost and institutional theories. Transaction
cost theory focuses on “efficiency” as the primary determinant of the choice of
organizational structure, while institutional theory regards “legitimacy” as the
primary factor.
2.3 The Internationalization Theories for Less Developed Countries
The leading theories above mainly take the developed countries as the
research target. Since 1960s and 1970s, many LDCs begin to engage in outward
activities and gradually become the import part of international labor division.
Some LDCs are moving away from wholly inward-oriented import substitution
policies toward outward-oriented export-led growth (Aulakh, Kotabe, and
Teegen, 2000). Compared with the developed countries, however, most LDCs do
not hold the competitive advantages or monopolistic advantages. Some new
theories are required to explain the internationalization of firms from those
countries and some new factors are required to be considered in the new global
marketing circumstance.

2.3.1 The Motivation of Outward Activities in Less Developed Countries
Wells (1977, 1986) elaborated systematically for the internationalization
behavior in developing countries. He claimed that the main motivations of
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outward activities of developing countries include the following points:
Protect the Export Market: Based on the research on many countries in Asian
and South America, Lewis (1991) found that because of the trade barriers as
tariff and quota limits, export is not a long-time plan for international operation
procedure for those countries, the capital investment in foreign markets, however,
protect most of their market.
Lower Cost: as the developed countries, the developing countries are searching
for the districts where have lower wage labors than their own to compete with the
export from other countries. Some countries invest in the third country to save
the transportation cost.
Race Relations: Developing countries make outward activities to serve the
same racial group. The outward investments linking to race relations are taking
some proportions in total outward investments amount, especially in India,
Thailand, and Hong Kong.
Risk Aversion:

The political situation in some developing countries is instable

and leads to the capital outflow from domestic enterprises. They engage in
outward activities to disperse such risks.
Other Motivations: They include the support of host county governments,
suggestions of consultant institution and staff training.
Ghymn (1980) also pointed out that based on different degree of economic
development, LDCs show variety of interesting motivations: 1. ethnic ties, 2. risk
reduction from economic and political instability at home, 3. solidification of
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business with trade partners, and 4. manpower exports.
Dunning(1993) argued that there are three key motivations for FDI: strategic
asset-seeking, resource-seeking, and market-seeking. Based on his argument, it is
claimed that some newly industrialized economies (NIEs) tend to invest in DCs
for either strategic asset-seeking or market-seeking purposes, small and large
LDCs for resource/labor-seeking purposes, and large LDCs for both resource and
market-seeking purposes (Makino, Lau and Yeh, 2002)

2.3.2 The Advantages of Less Developed Countries
Multinationals

from

LDCs

usually

utilized

smaller

scale,

more

labor-intensive, more flexible (among inputs and outputs) technology than did
other MNEs and often domestically owned firms (Lecraw 1977, 1979, 1981).
Their output was generally of lower quality than that of other MNEs and they
competed based more on lower price than on product differentiation (Wells 1983;
Lecraw 1977, 1981)
Makino, Lau and Yeh (2002) also claimed that there are three capabilities to
support the investment of NIEs: labor intensive production capability,
technology-based assets, and prior technology-seeking experience. All these
three capabilities are firm-specific factors. For the country-specific factors, there
are either natural endowments (e.g., low cost labor and natural resources) or
created endowments (e.g., strategic assets) available in a host country (location).
Other literature on the advantages of firms in LDCs includes the following
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three parts.
Small-scale Technical Advantages
Wells (1977, 1986) suggested that since the lower income countries have
limited market capacity, they may not able to gain the scale benefits through the
large scale production. Many enterprises in the LDCs develop some technology
skills which are labor intensive, production flexible and very suitable for small
scale production. Because of this kind of competitive advantage, the LDCs sell
the products at a lower price. Because of the low production cost and low labor
wage, cheap price is always a powerful arm for seizing the market share and the
competitive advantage compared with the developed countries.
Technical Localization
Lall (1983) claimed that the localization process of techniques in LDCs is
highly related with the factor price and quality in their own countries. For
small-scale enterprises, they can only benefit from these technologies if the
products can satisfy their own economic conditions and demands and also satisfy
medium and low consumption demands. Those conditions above lead to the
enterprises in LDCs to engage in internal innovative activities to construct and
develop their own competitive advantages.
Technique Innovation and Upgrade
Firms from LDCs are always regarded as lacking advanced technology and
specific assets. Cantwell, Tolentino and Paz (1990), however, explored the
technique innovation and upgrade theory in 1990s to explain the accelerated
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growth of direct investment to the developed countries from the LDCs in 1980s.
It was claimed that technological accumulation promotes the economic
development of one country. The LDCs may not have powerful R&D capabilities;
however, they grasp and develop the existent techniques through learning
experience and organizing capacity. It was also claimed that the industrial
distribution in the LDCs is predicable and changes as time goes on.
2.4 The Internationalization for Chinese Firms
Several reports indicate the more and more important role of China as an
investor country in recent years. By 2004, China was the eighth most important
source of FDI among developing countries (UNCTAD, 2005). A survey in 2005
also points out that China would become a top four source country of FDI over
the period 2005-2008 (UNCTAD, 2005). As revealed in UNCTAD’s World
Investment Report 2010, China is at the third position for FDI outflow, only
behind USA and France, with Chinese FDI outflow up to100 billion dollars
(UNCTAD, 2010).
Chinese outward investors can be regarded as being state-owned in the
period under study, since private firms were legally prohibited form investing
abroad prior to 2003. Since 1979, when outward direct investment (ODI) was
formally permitted under the “Open Door” policies, the internationalization of
Chinese firms has been tightly controlled by national and provincial government,
either directly, by administrative fiat, or indirectly , via economic policy and
other measures designed to advance the economic development agenda (Buckley
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et al., 2006,2007). Initially, OFDI was permitted on a very selective basis.
However, in recent years administrative controls have been relaxed, approval
processes and procedures streamlined, and the ceiling raised on the amount of
foreign exchange that can be committed to individual investment projects
(Sauvant, 2005).
The development of Chinese outward FDI experience has gone through three
stages. Between 1979 and 1985, China established 185 non-trading foreign
affiliates, mostly in the form of joint ventures. These oversea enterprises spread
over 45 countries and economies, primarily in the developing world. Many of
these early investment activities were to a great extent motivated by the
government’s policies rather than commercial interests (Cai, 1999). In the
1985-1990 period, China established 577 non-trading foreign affiliates. These
oversea enterprises spread over 90 countries and economies (including developed
countries), were involved in a much wider range of industries, such as
metallurgy/minerals,

petrochemicals/chemicals,

electronics/light

industry,

transportation, finance/insurance, medicine and tourism (Cai, 1999). In the
1990-present period, China’s overseas direct investment began to expand at an
unprecedented rate (Yang, 2003). China has become one of the top FDI exporters
among developing economies (Cai, 1999).
Although the traditional theories can be readily applied to emerging
economy investors in certain respects, they have some inevitable limitations for
explaining the outward activities of firms from less developed countries as we
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mentioned in the above parts. Buckley et al. (2007) argued that in the case of
emerging economy MNEs, especially for Chinese firms, there are likely to be
particular imperfections in home country capital markets that (potential) outward
investors can exploit. The imperfections are from (1) the state-owned (and
state-associated) firms may have capital made available to them at below market
rates; (2) inefficient banking systems may make soft loans to potential outward
investors, either as policy or through inefficiency; (3) conglomerate firms may
operate an inefficient internal capital that effectively subsidizes FDI; (4) family
owned firms may have access to cheap capital form family members. Buckley
(2004) also claimed that those market imperfections may be transformed into
ownership advantages by emerging economy firms.
Except for the market imperfections, the ownership advantages in China
including flexibility, economizing on the use of capital or resources, benefits
accruing from home country embeddedness (i.e., prior familiarity of operating
within an emerging market context), and the networking skills (i.e., the ethnic or
familial ties with the population in the host country) are mentioned by some
researchers as well (Wells, 1983, Erdener and Shapiro, 2005; Lau, 2003; Buckley,
2007).
In recent years, the institution-based view become more popular for
explaining the outward activities of emerging MNEs, and it is believed to have
the potential to help explain distinctiveness in the behavior of outward-investing
Chinese firms (North, 1990; Peng, 2002, Meyer and Nguyen, 2005). Those
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institutional factors include the home institutional environment which is formally
and informally enforced by government and its agents (Scott, 2002), the norms
and cognitions (Buckley, 2007) and high levels of government support, typically
in the form of privileged access to raw materials and other inputs, low-cost
capital, subsidies and other benefits help emerging country firms to offset
ownership and location disadvantages abroad (Aggarwal and Agmon, 1990).
Until now, however, there has not been a comprehensive study focusing on
the effect of institutional factors (including both of the home-institutional and
host -institutional factors) on the entry mode choice of Chinese multinationals.
Particularly, the interaction effect of the institutional factors on the entry mode
choice is mentioned less by extant studies.
2.5 Summary
Not only from the economic perspective, or from the behavioral perspective,
the leading theories of internationalization including the transaction cost
perspective (Anderson & Gatignon 1986), the OLI framework (Dunning 1988),
the IPLC theory (Vernon 1966, 1979), and the knowledge development process
model (Johanson & Vahlne 1977) are largely based on studies of firms from
developed economies and emphasize the firm-specific assets, the advanced
technology and the gradual process of knowledge development. These theories
are inadequate for explaining the internationalization behaviors of firms from
less developed countries. The expansion of emerging MNEs offers a unique
opportunity for theoretical development and empirical research of the factors that
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drive the internationalization of firms (Child & Rodrigues 2005).
Although recent developments in this area have shifted attention to the role
of institutional factors on the overseas investment behaviors of MNEs (Peng et al.
2008), they have not developed a comprehensive study on the effect of
institutional factors on the entry mode choice, but rather considered the effects of
institutional factors of the host country or those of the home country separately.
Nor is there enough empirical evidence to suggest that the influence of both
home-institutional and host-institutional factors for Chinese MNEs. In other
words, a comprehensive framework is needed to shed light on the entry mode
choice in the perspective of institutional factors.
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CHAPTER 3. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
3.1 Institutional Factors and Entry Mode Choice
Firms face two types of risks when entering a foreign market. On one hand,
there are contractual risks with high transaction cost for the firms with ownership
advantages when they engage in international transactions. On the other hand,
firms face environmental risks when they enter an unfamiliar market. Facing the
dual risks, firms make a trade-off between the high control modes to protect their
particular know-how and minimize the transaction cost and the low control
modes that allow adapting their strategies flexibly in an uncertain environment.
Based on the conventional theoretical thinking, firms without ownership
advantages, such as those from less developed countries, are expected either to
avoid entering foreign markets or use a low control mode such as exporting.
In recent years, however, multinationals from emerging market economies
such as China, India and Brazil have expanded rapidly in the international
markets in search of market opportunities, natural resources, and strategic assets
such as brand, technology and distribution channels (Child and Rodrigues 2005).
Although these firms may lack firm-specific advantages, they have been
observed to enter foreign countries with high-control modes such as joint
ventures (JVs) and wholly owned subsidiaries (WOS). While the usual
location-specific factors remain an important variable when explaining their
entry modes choice, they have been referred to mainly host country factors. In
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recent years, the location-specific factors have been extended to the home
country factors and particularly the home country institutions, especially for
firms from less developed countries, which often “leverage” their relationship
networks and incentives and support from their home governments in their
overseas expansion. In the absence of firm-specific advantages (FSAs), these
home country institutional factors may entail certain comparative ownership
advantages or country-specific advantages (CSAs), which can help shed light on
the entry mode strategies of firms from emerging market economies (Cantwell et
al. 2010; Sun et al. 2011).
As the transaction cost theory has been criticized for offering an
under-socialized

view

of

organizational

activities

(Granovetter,

1985),

institutional theory has emerged as a more complementary approach to the study
of organization-environment relations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2001;
Zucker, 1987). At first, it can better explain why some EMMNCs without
specific assets can choose the high control modes in a foreign market. Moreover,
unlike the transaction cost theory that is constrained to the “economic school”,
institutional theory integrates more social-specific factors, such as home
government support, which are more in line with China's actual conditions. At
last, as EMMNCs are more concerned with environmental risks than transaction
costs, institutional factors can affect firms’ perceptions and tolerance of risks. In
this study, we examine the effects of institutional factors from both the host
country and home country on the foreign entry modes of EMMNCs. For the host
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country institutional factors, we focus on the institutional quality and cultural
distance as they reflect the environment risks in the host countries. Government
support and ownership type represent the home country institutional factors.
Then, we examine the main effects of those institutional factors as well as the
interactive effects between them. We argue that home government support and
ownership type of firms not only affect the entry modes choice by changing the
risk tolerance of the decision makers of the firms but also moderate the effect of
the host institutional factors. Meanwhile, although firms from emerging market
economies may enjoy advantages in cheap labor force and resources, they often
lack world-class technology and innovation ability. Thus, the licensing mode for
outward investment is almost non-existent. In this study, we will not consider
licensing but focus on the choice between the equity-based modes (JV and WOS)
and non-equity-based mode (export).
Extant studies from the perspective of institutional factors largely focus on
three main contents: institutional quality, institutional profile and culture
distance. Institutional quality refers to the institutional factors which can support
an effective market mechanism or not (North, 1990; Peng, 2008; Meyer et al.
2009). These factors include some market-supporting factors, for example,
government stability, socio-economic conditions, investment conflict, property
rights, and information systems (Meyer et al. 2009; Busse and Hefeker, 2007).
Institutional profile includes various aspects of the cross-country factors as
cultural norms, social knowledge, rules and regulations and others. Based on
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Scott’s (1995) three pillars of institutional environments—regulatory, cognitive,
and normative, Kostova (1997) further introduced the concept of a three
dimensional country institutional profile to explain how a country ‘s government
policies (constituting a regulatory dimension), widely shared social knowledge (a
cognitive dimension), and value systems (a normative dimension) affect
domestic business activity (Busenitz et al.2000).
Culture distance belongs to the institutional profile, but measures the
difference between the host country and home country and has been adopted by
some researchers. Culture distance has been used to represent the institutional
profile several times in the previous literature about the location-specific factors
(Dunning, 1993; Tihanyi et al.2005). Cultural context is thought to be helpful in
defining profit potentials and/ or the risks associated with a specific entry mode
(Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000). Most of the studies of cultural distance are
based on Hofstede’s (1980) culture dimensions, but with some inconsistent
results. Some studies have indicated a negative relationship between cultural
distance and MNE performance (e.g., Luo and Peng, 1999), while other studies
have found a positive effect (e.g., Morosini et al., 1998). However, culture
distance surely should have some effects on the entry modes choice, especially
for the countries with deep cultural background as China (Pan and Tse, 2000).
Thus, in our study, we focus on institutional quality and cultural distance as two
host institutional factors.
Until now, most studies on institutional factors have emphasized the
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attributes of the host countries, and neglected the role of the home-country based
institutional factors. Although some studies mention the effect of government
support on the entry modes choice, most of them are based on the government
support in the host countries. There has been no comprehensive effort to examine
the role of government from the home countries. Our study will elaborate the
effect of host country government support on entry mode choice.
Moreover, the traditional international business research has not paid much
attention to ownership types (i.e., state versus private). This is not surprising
because private ownership tends to be norm in these economies (Peng et al.
2004). Ownership type, however, has become increasingly important when the
research expanded to emerging economies (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Peng, 2000);
especially as the effect of ownership type on the management strategy in these
economies has some notable difference and characteristics. Thus, in our study,
government support and ownership type serve as home institutional factors.
In summary, this study takes into account both of the host country and home
country institutional factors and also their interactive effects on the foreign
market entry modes of EMMNCs (Figure 1).
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3.1.1 Institutional Quality
Borrmann et al. (2005) claimed that institutional quality results from the
efficiency of the rules of economic interaction and the effectiveness of their
enforcement. In any given country environment, the institutional arrangements
would be “strong” if they support the voluntary exchanges underpinning an
effective market (Meyer et al. 2001). Conversely, the institutions are “weak” if
they fail to ensure effective market or even undermine the market (e.g., corrupt
business practices). High quality institutions promote larger scale project and use
more efficient technologies. It increases productivity, improves competitiveness,
facilitates structural change and contributes to a better division of labour in the
national and international context (Borrmann et al., 2005)
North (1990) suggested that institutional theory must be combined with
transaction cost theory because institutions provide the structure in which
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transactions occur. Thus, from the transaction cost perspective, the institutional
quality of a target country influences foreign entrants’ mode decisions by
moderating the costs of alternative organizational forms. High institutional
quality help to decrease various costs in international transaction processes, such
as the cost of monitoring, managing and inspecting performance, which are often
associated the equity-based modes of overseas investment. Hill, Hwang, and Kim
(1990) argue that firms can incur lower transaction costs by utilizing lower
ownership modes in host countries with greater political risk and uncertainty.
When there is a low institutional quality, because the lack of information for the
target country with great market risk and uncertainty, firms should avoid taking
the equity modes in case of the high transaction cost, such as the monitoring cost
and the enforcement cost. Overall, everything else being equal, strong
institutional frameworks lowers the costs of doing business, albeit making the
equity modes for attractive for EMMNCs. However, institutional environment
has also received much attention in conceptual and empirical studies of entry
mode choice. From the environment risk perspective, high institutional quality
may decrease the perceived risk of the decision makers of firms.
Anderson and Gatignon (1986) argued that in more externally uncertain and
volatile environments firms are better off utilizing low control ownership modes
(e.g., joint ventures instead of wholly-owned subsidiaries) because of the
increased flexibility provided to the firm. Based on the data from of 31
developing countries, Jun and Singh (1996) find that political risks significantly
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affect entry modes of firms and that countries with higher political risks attract
less FDI. Lower corruption and nationalization risks and better contract
enforcement can lead to higher FDI inflows. Furthermore, environment stability
decreases the perceived risks of investors (Gastanaga et al. 1998). Too much
change in institutional arrangements creates chaos and may reduce the
opportunity for organizational changes necessary to compete effectively in
foreign markets, making equity-based modes more risky and costly. When a host
country has low institutional quality, firms react to such volatility by avoiding
ownership and attempt to retain flexibility and shift risk to outsiders. Therefore,
compared with equity-based entry modes, the non-equity-based entry modes as
export would be preferred in countries of low institutional quality, and vice versa.
Hypothesis 1: The higher institutional quality a host country has, the more
favorable the equity modes (JV and WOS) are as opposed to the non-equity
mode (export) in foreign market entry.

3.1.2 Cultural Distance
Cultural distance indicates the differences in cultural institutions between a
home country and each target country (Kogut & Singh 1988). Cultural
differences play a major role in increasing or decreasing managerial effectiveness
in using firm-specific advantages at a foreign location (Hofstede 2001). However,
there have been two opposing views about the effect of cultural distance on the
entry modes choice. One stream of literature posits that greater cultural distance
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between the home and the foreign market leads to a higher level of equity
ownership in a firm's entry mode choice (Root, 1987; Davidson and McFeteridge,
1985; Tihanyi et al. 2005). This positive relationship between cultural distance
and equity investment is based on the perspective of control and transaction cost.
Because cultural distance leads to greater information asymmetry and thus
increases the costs of information and monitoring, firms prefer equity entry
modes for exerting greater control in order to minimize transaction costs. From
transaction cost theory, internalization is preferred when the firms are likely to
take advantage of limited knowledge and assets and when future transaction
contingencies could not be specified because of uncertainty or complexity
(Williamson, 1975; Beamish and Banks, 1987). Thus, when the cultural distance
is large, firms tend to choose the equity mode to absorb the external uncertainties
through centralization of decision making, provide a reduction in transaction
costs, and protect the firm from opportunistic behavior in the target country.
Although control is an important consideration, entry mode choice in
relationship to cultural distance can also be explained in the risk-reduction
perspective. The other perspective argues conversely that there is a negative
relationship between cultural distance and equity investment (Gatignon and
Anderson 1988; Hill et al., 1990; Kim and Hwang, 1992; Nakos et al., 2002).
This argument is based on the contingency approach, according to which a
flexible organization will be better prepared to adapt to changing conditions
(Lawrence and Lrosch, 1967). Under conditions of high cultural distance, firms
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should restrict their resource commitment and thus reduce their risk exposure in
these markets. In this case, MNCs may require greater flexibility, resulting in
preferences for modes of entry with lower control such as export. Moreover,
from Hennart and Larimo (1998), as the degree of cultural distance increases, the
firm’s acquisition of local knowledge through local experience becomes more
difficult and costly. The foreign investor is more likely to form a JV with less
equity investment rather than the WOS to acquire local assets and knowledge.
Given that firms from emerging markets often lack transaction-specific
assets and technology advantages, we argue that the first theoretical perspective
on minimizing the costs arising from cultural distance may not be applicable.
First, firms lacking ownership advantages may not need more control to reduce
the contractual risks as much as those with FSAs. Moreover, control is often
based on the choice between JV and WOS, or between licensing and FDI. In this
study, we focus on the choice between export and the equity entry modes. As a
country of great cultural distance increases the transaction costs such as the
information costs and monitoring costs, export should be preferred as it is less
influenced by these factors. Thus, we propose that there is a negative relationship
between cultural distance and equity investment.
Hypothesis 2: The lower cultural distances there is between the host country
and home, the more favorable the equity modes (JV and WOS) are as opposed to
the non-equity mode (export) in foreign market entry.
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3.1.3 Home Government Support
Government support has been regarded as one of the influential institutional
factors in studies of entry mode choices. Overall, a positive relationship has been
found between government support and equity investment overseas (Hitt et al.
2004). Most of the studies, however, focused on the government policies and
incentives in the host countries and have not paid sufficient attention to the role
of the home country government. The important role of selective policies for
attracting the inward FDI, such as fiscal incentives and lower tariffs, has been
examined in some extant studies (Pan and Tse, 2000). As EMMNCs become
more involved in overseas markets, however, home government bodies from
these countries have provided various incentives and administrative mechanisms
to encourage firms to move abroad for growth and expansion. Consequently,
home government often plays a key role in outward FDI activities by providing
favorable policies, financial support, and government connections in host
countries. Yiu et al.(2007) pointed that in some emerging economies, firms have
to seek for government approval when they plan to establish foreign ventures.
For instance, Okuda (1994) found that the trade and FDI policies in Taiwan had
changed in two decades and analyzed the important effect of home government
support for the trade situation of Taiwan.
Over the past years, China has been regarded as the hotbed in attracting
foreign investment. Nonetheless, by the rapid growth of FDI outflows, Chinese
firms had invested a total of 100 billion abroad by 2010 (UNCTAD, 2010). In
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China, the government has launched a "going out" campaign since 2003 to steer
firms' outward movement in the pursuit of advanced technologies, R&D
capabilities, or strategic assets such as brands and distribution channels. For
example, in Guangdong Province of China, government even subsidizes
companies in their visits to the developed countries to study the business
practices and to enhance their R&D capabilities. Deng (2007) summarized that
there are two significant and distinct features for Chinese outward FDI: the
critical role of the Chinese government support and the increasing use of merges
and acquisitions as a mode of entry. Institutional links are especially important in
China, where there is deep involvement of the government in directing outward
FDI (Cai, 1999). The motivation of the policymakers is not restricted to the sales
of products but also pursuit of strategic asset and technical collaboration.
Non-equity mode as export cannot satisfy the growth for EMMNCs to compete
in global market. Overall, government support not only provides the incentives
for firm's outward movement but also helps lower the perceived environmental
risks and boost the confidence of firms in their overseas investment activities and
in the pursuit of greater control in foreign market entry. Therefore, government
support from the home country should have a positive effect on the equity-based
entry modes:
Hypothesis 3: Firms with government support in the home country are more
likely to adopt the equity modes (JV and WOS) as opposed to non-equity mode
(export) when entering foreign markets.
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3.1.4 Ownership Type
For the internationalization in developed economies, the previous studies
traditionally have not paid much attention to ownership issues (i.e., state-owned
versus private firms). This is not surprising because private ownership tends to be
the norm in the developed economies. However, as the studies have expanded to
emerging economies (Hoskisson et al. 2000; Peng, 2000), ownership has become
an increasingly important issue, generating a growing literature which examines
the effects of ownership on internationalization from organizational perspectives
(Zahra et al. 2000).
In emerging market economies, firms with different ownership arrangements
vary greatly in (dis)advantages as a result of variation of institutional constraints
across the types of enterprises (Zhou & van Witteloostuijn 2010). For instance,
officially, as defined in Table 3, Chinese enterprises include state-owned
enterprises (SOEs), collective owned enterprises(COEs), mixed enterprises
(MEs), foreign owned enterprises (FOEs), joint ventures (JVs) and domestic
private owned enterprises (POEs).
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Table 3 Officially defined ownership types in China
Ownership Type Definition
SOE

State-owned enterprises. Enterprises owned by the central government.
The government is responsible for appointing managers and the
performances of firms.
COE
Collective-owned enterprises. Enterprises owned by local
governments. For example, township and village enterprises are
collective-owned enterprises.
ME
Mixed enterprises. Newly privatized enterprises in which government
holds certain percentage of shares while the rest of the shares are held
by private shareholders.
FOE
Wholly foreign-owned enterprises, including enterprises owned by
overseas Chinese.
JV
Joint ventures, including joint ventures between foreign firms and
Chinese SOEs, foreign firms and Chinese COEs, and foreign firms and
domestic private firms.
POE
Domestic private-owned enterprises, including sole proprietorships
and partnerships.
Source: Z. Wei et al., Journal of Multinational Financial Management. 12 (2002)
p: 61-78
In our study, because of the blurring boundary between collectively owned,
privately owned, and foreign-invested firms (including those from Hong Kong,
Macro and Taiwan) in terms of the degree of privatization, we categorize these
three ownership types as non-state owned, in contrast to state owned. In our
study, we focus on the distinction between state-owned and non-state-owned
firms. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) enjoy greater government support than
private firms. Most SOEs rely on the state as their primary banker, supplier, and
distributor, although vigorous measures are now being undertaken to push at
least some of them to the market domain (Steinfeld, 1998). They are often the
beneficiaries of government protection and less subject to market competition. In
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contrast, non-state-owned firms do not have these advantages and operate more
under the principles of market economy without the various resource
endowments, thus are more risk aversive and conservative. Moreover, SOEs are
often much bigger firms and have a longer operating history. In fact, large SOEs
account for a overwhelming majority of the total outward FDI from China. Up to
2006, the proportion of the outward FDI made by the SOEs is as high as 81%,
and the top ten enterprises based on the overseas asset holdings are all SOEs.
While benefiting the most from government support, SOEs also suffer from the
bureaucratic mentality and a culture of dependency, soft budget constraint, as
well as lack of management autonomy (Wilkinson et al. 2006). Meanwhile, they
are expected to be more responsive to government agenda, including that of
"going out," and often less concerned with the transaction costs in international
business and the efficiency in capital utilization. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 4: SOEs are more likely to adopt the equity modes (JV and
WOS) than non-state-owned enterprises when entering foreign markets.

3.1.5 Interactive Effects of Institutional Factors
As we mentioned above, a firm will face dual risks when entering the
foreign market. On one hand, there are contractual risks with high transaction
cost for the firms with transaction-specific assets and ownership advantages
when they become involved in international transactions. On the other hand,
there are environmental risks when firms enter an unfamiliar market. However,
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as a country without the transaction-specific assets and technology advantages,
the environmental risks would be more important when making an entry mode
decision. The attitude of firms towards the environmental risks and the
corresponding mode they choose depend on their level of risk tolerance.
Investor’s risk tolerance in the previous literature refers to the maximum amount
of investment risk someone is comfortable taking (Schaefer, 1978). Thus, the risk
tolerance in our study would refers to the maximum amount of investment risk a
firm is capable of taking.
We have already discussed the host country factors in perspective of
institutional quality and culture distance, which are regarded as the measurement
of the environment risk in the target country. Then we further argue the effect of
host country factors on the entry modes decision is moderated by the home
country factors through changing the risk tolerance level of firms. First, we argue
that the home government support moderates the effect of host institutional
factors on the entry modes of firms. Despite the high transaction costs and
greater risks caused by low institutional quality and cultural distance, firms with
greater home government support are likely to have a higher level of risk
tolerance. These firms are to be “cushioned” when they “fall”. In a way,
collectivism acts as implicit mutual insurance against catastrophic losses. This is
why members from strong social collectives will, quite accurately, perceive the
hazards of risky options to be smaller (Weber & Hsee 1998). In China, the
government is similar to a timely “helper” to the firms and hence boosts their
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confidence in adopting the equity modes in foreign market entry. Therefore,
facing the environment risks due to the host institutional factors, firms with
greater home government support would have higher risk tolerance and are more
likely to choose the aggressive mode of foreign market entry. These firms would
be less prudent than they should be in taking on the environmental risks, because
they believe that, if they fail, the government will bail them out of difficult
situations.
Second, when facing the different level of environment risks in a target
market, some Chinese firms would have high risk tolerance (more risk-seeking)
and lead to moral hazard. Moral hazard is a pervasive feature of insurance and
other forms of risk sharing. It arises when the provision of insurance increases
the probability of the event being insured against, usually because it diminishes
the incentives for the insured party to take preventive actions. Any insurance
entails moral hazard when the behavior of the insured party can influence the
probability of the event insured against and there is either asymmetric
information or some other reason the insurer cannot respond fully (by adjusting
terms or canceling coverage) to behavior that leads to an increase in the event’s
probability (Lane and Phillips, 2000). In our study, the insuring party would be
the government who is sharing the risk of the Chinese firms. The reason that lead
to this behavior and increase the probabilities of moral hazard would be
information asymmetry, in that the government overweigh the ability of the firms
and their investing strategies. Moreover, it is necessary for Chinese firms to

48

select partners with capabilities that are complementary to their technical and
management experience defection. At last, firms in China often lack autonomy to
some extent and have to resign to the wills of government. Firms receiving
government support are viewed to help the government to realize its goals. For
example, during the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake, many private firms benefiting
from the government enthusiastically donated money to alleviate the burden of
government. Government would try its best to support the firms to achieve its
own goals. Therefore, as there is support by the other party, the moral hazard is
prone to happen. For example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been
criticized for its lending practices and having contributed to the spreading of
financial crises in emerging markets. Because after the economic crisis, the
official international support to assist emerging market countries facing external
payments difficulties induces these countries and their private creditors to be less
prudent than they should be in taking on risks (Mussa, 2004). In our study,
Chinese firms would be also less prudent than they should be in taking on the
environmental risks, because they believe that, if they fail, the government will
help to bail them out of their difficulties. In other words, Chinese firms would
have higher risk tolerance when entering the foreign market under the support of
the government. Therefore, we argue that even though there are high
environmental risks in a host country; Chinese firms would still choose some
risky modes (equity modes) because of their high risk tolerance.
Last, in the drive toward internationalization, the home country
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governments often act as the champion for these home-grown multinationals.
They often serve the agent or promoter of these firms, for instance, by leading
investment tours, building business and government connections, offering
language training and cultural immersion programs, providing market research
and other types of services. In other words, government support helps to mitigate
the environment risks in the host countries and minimize the effect of cultural
distance. Firms under the auspices and support of home government are often
better received and treated in the host countries.

Therefore, when there are

great environmental risks in the host country, whether it is due to institutional
quality or cultural distance, firms with greater support from the home
government would be more ready to adopt the more risky equity modes of entry
as compared with those without government support.
Hypothesis 5: The positive effect of institutional quality in the host country
on the adoption of equity modes of entry is greater for firms with government
support than those without such support.
Hypothesis 6: The negative effect of cultural distance on the adoption of
equity modes of entry is smaller for firms with government support than those
without such support.
Likewise, the ownership type of firms also moderates the effect of host
institutional factors on the entry mode of firms. Firms with different types of
ownership may vary in their resources and abilities to deal with environment
uncertainties in foreign markets. As state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are often
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larger firms, have more experiences, and are more resourceful, hence less
concerned with environmental uncertainty in the overseas markets. Moreover,
while SOEs also enjoy greater government support and preferential policies, they
are also more responsive to government agenda on the internationalization of
firms as compared with private firms. Thus, SOEs have greater ability to cope
with the environment risks in overseas markets and are less subject to the
institutional constraints in overseas markets. In contrast, private firms are often
smaller and less resourceful in dealing environmental uncertainty in overseas
markets. Meanwhile, since many private firms are stock-ownership companies
and are responsible to multiple stakeholders, they are more concerned with risks
associated with overseas investment, costs of equity investment, and challenges
of operating across national boundaries. Thus, non-state-owned firms should be
more subject to the institutional constraints in a host country characterized by
low institutional quality and/or great cultural distance. Therefore, ownership type
of firms can significantly moderate the influence of the host institutional factors
on the entry mode of firms expanding overseas.
Hypothesis 7: The positive effect of institutional quality in the host country
on the adoption of equity modes of entry is greater for SOEs than
non-state-owned firms.
Hypothesis 8: The negative effect of cultural distance on the adoption of
equity modes of entry is greater for SOEs than non-state-owned firms.
3.2 Investment Type and Entry Mode Choice
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3.2.1 Main effect of Investment Types
MNCs make different types of investment in foreign countries, and
investment type influences the entry mode choice (Caves, 1971; Han, 2002;
Mattoo, Olarreaga & Saggi, 2004). To explain the effect of investment type on
entry mode choice, we would only focus on the equity mode choice between the
internalizing activities (wholly owned subsidiaries) and the externalizing
activities (joint ventures), leaving the mode of export aside. There are mainly
three types of investment, likely R&D, market-seeking, as well as manufacturing.
These three types are differentiated by R&D intensity, with R&D investment
having the highest R&D intensity and sales divisions the lowest one. Many
researchers have examined the relationship between R&D intensity and entry
mode (Han, 2002). The major rationale for an entry strategy in the context of
R&D intensity is whether or not the company should internalize the R&D
activities based on risk analysis. MNCs increasingly have moved their R&D
operations to absorb talent and ideas from overseas. But R&D activities face
uncertainty and misappropriability hazards (Gambardella, 1995). MNCs with
high technology products always prefer wholly owned subsidiaries to joint
venture because they have no need for local partners to add local inputs and they
fear the loss of quality, control, technological information, and monopoly profits
which might occur if they form joint ventures with local business (Wells, 1973).
Thus, companies tend to internalize their R&D activities to alleviate the
uncertainty from the perspective of risk aversion. For example, in biotechnology
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R&D investment, in-house R&D project can prohibit the team members from
leaking know-how to competitors (Pisano, 1990). In contrast, if R&D project is
carried at a different location, the risks of leakage would increase. Even if the
contractual restrictions on transferring knowledge can be designed ex ante, it is
hard to safeguard the R&D output, and enforcement is rather problematic.
Consequently, as the misappropriability hazard would arise, MNCs prefer wholly
owned subsidiaries when entering foreign markets in R&D operations. Although
China has always been regarded as the “world factory” with a short history for
the R&D investment abroad, there have been more and more R&D investment
and products with high technologies in recent years, such as Lenovo’s R&D
center in North Carolina in U.S.A.
In contrast, if the investment is low in R&D intensity, like market-seeking in
host country, these risks would be much lower. The investment in market-seeking
always has the undifferentiated products without technological advantage. Also
from Vernon’s IPLC theory, the production is moved to the foreign markets when
the products become mature enough. The investors may go abroad to seize the
low price resources and explore the new market. Thus, compared with protecting
the specific assets and essential technologies, the local information would be
more important for those investors because it is not necessary to hold much more
control rights. It is better for them to acquire the knowledge of local markets, the
economic environment, political regulations, raw materials sources and
distribution channels by forming joint ventures with local partners.
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At last, for the manufacturing investment, even it belongs to the investment
type which has low R&D intensity as well; there is a slight difference from the
market-seeking investment type. Since China has always been regarded as the
manufacturing country and the FDI inward attractive hot land, it has a long
history for products manufacturing, such as in the mode of OEM. China has the
advantage of cheap resources and lots of experience for operating manufacturing
business. Even when facing a new foreign market, Chinese firms are more likely
to choose the wholly-owned subsidiary rather than joint venture for two reasons.
On one hand, Chinese firms can do the job well without forming joint ventures
with local partners because of their abundant experience of taking manufacturing
business. They more tend to hold whole control rights and increase the flexibility
in the foreign market. On the other hand, even Chinese firms go to the less
developed countries for searching the resources even cheaper than in China, the
poor institutional quality in those countries would have smaller effects on the
entry mode because they have the experience of operating in Third World
countries and quite familiar with the ways to cope with the pool institutional
quality countries.
Therefore, in perspective of assets protection, risk aversion and the
experience of Chinese firms, we propose the investment type should have
influence on the entry mode choice in that:
Hypothesis 9a: Firms making R&D investment prefer internalizing activities
(wholly owned subsidiaries) to externalizing activities (joint ventures).
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Hypothesis 9b: Firms making market-seeking investment prefer joint ventures to
wholly owned subsidiaries.
Hypothesis 9c: Firms making manufacturing investment prefer wholly owned
subsidiaries to joint ventures.

3.2.2 The Effect of Institutional Factors in a Certain Investment Type
The firm’s location and control decisions are both determined by the
interrelation between the cost of executing these value-adding activities in
various locations, knowledge flow costs between these activities (Buckley &
Carter, 2004; Kogut & Zander, 1993; Martin & Salomon, 2003) and the cost of
product flows to the market. Buckley and Hashai (2005) claimed that the location
decision is where to locate each value-adding activity so that the overall costs are
minimized. Based on transaction cost theory, firms making R&D investment are
holding some specific assets and prefer to locate the new products in their own
country or the countries with technology advantages. Moreover, for many
EMMNCs, overseas investment or internationalization is not the end, but the
means to acquire strategic assets and proprietary knowledge, especially R&D
capabilities. Since such capabilities cannot be developed within over a short
period, EMMNCs often invest in overseas R&D operations to upgrade their
technology and product capabilities (Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Deng, 2007).
Thus, R&D opportunities are more often available in advanced economies than
in LDCs. Followed by Vernon’s IPLC theory, firms making market-seeking
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investment abroad are holding the mature products. To be closer to a broad
customer group and avoid the trade barriers, firms tend to establish marketing
divisions in the advanced countries rather than LDCs to better serve those
comparably “richer” foreign customers. As for the manufacturing investment,
according to the product cycle framework, the relative importance of R&D and
knowledge flow costs would decline over time; it’s generally believed that firms
making manufacturing investment prefer to go to LDCs to acquire cheap nature
or labor resources. Thus, based on Buckley’s framework, the relationship
between investment types and location choice could be summarized in Table 4:

Table 4: Investment Type and Location Choice
Activities/Country
LDCs
(resource-rich)
DC

Marketing
-

Production
+

R&D
-

+

-

+

However, we find the results for Chinese firms are not quite consistent with
Buckley’s framework by using our data of 314 Chinese multinationals. As China
is one of the largest newly industrialized economies, in our model, we classify
the locations into Developed Countries, Newly Industrialized Economies and
Less Developed Countries. Based on the results in Table 5, among Chinese firms
that have set up OFDI operations in R&D in overseas markets, nearly half of
them have done so in developed countries (48.4%). These results are consistent
with the traditional arguments that Chinese firms have looked to the advanced
economies as a major avenue for Chinese firms to acquire new technologies for
production and products. Among Chinese firms that have set up OFDI operations
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in market-seeking in overseas markets, majority of the firms have established this
type of operation in developed countries (46.3%), but not significantly more than
in newly industrialized economies and the less developed countries (24.1% and
29.6% respectively) (Table 6). As for the FDI projects in manufacturing
established by Chinese firms overseas, also the majority of them are in
economically developed nations (44.6%), significantly much more so than in
newly industrialized economies and the less developed countries (22.8% and
32.6% respectively), indicating that Chinese firms also prefer to pursue the
production opportunities in the economically more advanced markets which is
quite inconsistent with Buckley’s framework (Table 7).
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Thus, to enrich the “economic school” in IB research and for better
explanation of entry strategy for Chinese multinationals, we further argue that
investment types are intertwined with institutions (Caves, 1971; Han, 2002;
Mattoo et al., 2004). We expect some interactive effect between institutional
factors and investment types in terms of their effects on entry modes.
For the home institutional factors, i.e. government support and ownership
type, as we explained before, even though there are great environmental risks in
the host country; firms with greater support from the home government would be
more ready to adopt the more risky equity modes of entry as compared with
those without government support. Even the Chinese enterprises with their own
specific assets or advanced technologies are concerned with leaking
technological information and thus resist forming joint ventures with local firms;
this kind of fear and risk could be reduced by the home government support. The
government support, once again, become the “big cushion” as a way of risk
aversion when the firms face the potential risk of knowledge know-how loss.
Moreover, because SOEs have greater ability to cope with the environment risks
in overseas markets and are less subject to the institutional constraints in
overseas markets. There is the same reason for the risk sharing by the
state-owned enterprises.
R&D investment has long been considered as a very important stimulus for
the economics development. Government would provide essential financial
support and policies favorable for the R&D investment. In recent years, Chinese
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government has made lots of preferential policies to encourage the firms’ R&D
investment abroad since the “go-global” strategy was issued. China has been
trying to shake off the title of “world factory” and make some products with its
own technologies. Some big multinationals, as Huawei, Haier and Lenovo, were
supported to have built R&D centers in the foreign market a few years ago. More
and more enterprises, especially for the SOEs, have begun to take R&D
investment abroad by mergence and acquisitions or joint ventures with foreign
local business, such as China Telecom. Therefore, we argue that firms making
R&D investment abroad would be influenced by the home institutional factors,
i.e. government support and ownership type in that:
Hypothesis 10: Firms making R&D investment with government support
prefer externalizing activities (joint ventures) to internalizing activities (wholly
owned subsidiaries) than those without such support.
Hypothesis 11: SOEs making R&D investment prefer externalizing
activities (joint ventures) to internalizing activities (wholly owned subsidiaries)
than non-state-owned firms.

For the host institutional factors, previous studies have focused on host
country’s institutions and R&D investment (Han, 2002; Leahy & Naghavi, 2006;
Naghavi & Leahy, 2008). The major rationale is that R&D intensive activities are
sensitive to the mechanism of intellectual property protection (IPP). The
mechanism of IPP plays an important role in the decision making of entry mode
because

company’s

competitive

advantages
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increasingly

come

from

knowledge-based assets. As these assets can be copied by the competitors, firms
rely on regulatory regimes to protect their knowledge-based assets and to
maintain their competition advantage. However, not all countries have a strong
IPP regime. In some countries piracy and infringement are rampant and the
intellectual property can not be effectively protected. MNCs then protect their
intellectual property by themselves, and also by internalizing R&D activities
(Leahy & Naghavi, 2006; Maskus, 1998; Naghavi & Leahy, 2008). When the
mechanism of IPP is strong, MNCs may be willing to adopt joint ventures for
R&D activities. When such a regime is weak, the obvious choice is to take the
WOS mode for R&D investment (Leahy & Naghavi, 2006; Naghavi & Leahy,
2008). The high institutional quality indicates a good investment environment,
and thus a comparably strong IPP mechanism.
Furthermore, Liu (2009) claimed that the outward R&D investment for
Chinese firms could be divided into three types which are Applied R&D
Investment, Basic R&D investment and Learning R&D investment. Applied
R&D Investment is the combination of existing technical resource of Chinese
firms and the information in foreign local market. This kind of investment would
not reinforce the core technology of Chinese firms, but localize the technology
and improve the product competitiveness in the local market. Basic R&D
investment is a way to improve firms’ existing technology by exploiting foreign
local basic technology and R&D resources which include local talent, low talent
cost or the other low R&D cost. Learning R&D investment is to build R&D
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center in the developed countries, learn and monitor the latest innovation
information and trend.

It’s not necessary for those R&D center to do some

R&D work, but search and collect the latest trend in related areas in advanced
countries. China has a very short history of outward R&D investment and most
of Chinese MNCs belong to the third group of R&D investment type. They are in
the process of learning and gathering the latest R&D information in advanced
countries. The high institutional quality and low cultural distance would decrease
the marketing barrier and make them more easily to access to the true
technological information in local market through the local partners. Thus when
the investment environment is satisfactory i.e. the institutional quality is high and
cultural distance is small between China and the target country, Chinese firms are
more willing to form joint ventures with local entrepreneurs to learn and
gathering the information when making the R&D investment. Therefore, we
propose the host institutional factors would have influence on the firms making
R&D investment in that:
Hypothesis 12: The higher institutional quality a host country has, the more
favorable the externalizing modes (joint ventures) are as opposed to the
internalizing modes (wholly owned subsidiaries) for the firms are making R&D
investment.
Hypothesis 13: The lower cultural distances there is between the host
country and home, the more favorable the externalizing modes (joint ventures)
are as opposed to the internalizing modes (wholly owned subsidiaries) for the
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firms are making R&D investment.

Dunning (1993) argued that enterprises making investment to seek market in
the foreign market through FDI for a variety of reasons: to expand the existing
domestic buyer-supplier relationships in host countries; to avoid being preempted
by the rivals’ entry into a particular host country; to produce products close to
local markets; to lower transportation costs; and, to benefit from investment
incentives. It is suggested that firms prefer to go to upstream countries
(developed countries) to attract more high income customers for differentiated
goods, and more likely to go to downstream countries (less developed countries)
to attract low income customers for labor intensive goods (Makino, Lau and Yeh,
2002). In perspective transaction cost theory, we argue in the last part that firms
should fear the risk of technology loss when taking the R&D investment in the
foreign market. In this case, government support and state-owned type may share
the perceived risk of firms and increase the risk-aversion of them. For the
market-seeking investment, however, risk of technology loss would not be
important to this kind of situation. As for the current situation of Chinese
industry status and products development, most firms making outward
market-seeing investment should have the labor intensive goods which are
mature enough. Therefore, it is difficult to suggest the effect of home institutional
factors (government support and ownership type) on the entry modes for the
market-seeking investment.
For the host institutional factors, however, we argue that they should have
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certain influence on the entry modes between joint ventures and wholly-owned
subsidiaries. Firms exploring new market opportunities in a foreign country must
tend to invest in countries where market potential is large than in countries with
small market potential (Makino, Lau and Yeh, 2002). Lecraw (1991) also
claimed that the rate of growth of domestic demand and changes in the tariff rate
had a significant impact on market-seeking investment. When firms explore a
new market abroad, the local economic and political environment should be the
very important factors in consideration. Moreover, if Chinese firms need local
information and local inputs, it’s easier for them to access to the information and
communicate with the local business if there is small cultural distance between
China and the host country. Therefore, we propose that the host institutional
factors would have influence on the entry modes between JV and WOS for the
market-seeking investment in that:
Hypothesis 14: The higher institutional quality a host country has, the more
favorable the externalizing modes (joint ventures) are as opposed to the
internalizing modes (wholly owned subsidiaries) for the firms are making
market-seeking investment.
Hypothesis 15: The lower cultural distances there is between the host
country and home, the more favorable the externalizing modes (joint ventures)
are as opposed to the internalizing modes (wholly owned subsidiaries) for the
firms are making market-seeking investment.

For the last investment type, the manufacturing investment, we do not
63

consider the effects of home institutions for the same reason as the
market-seeking investment. Most firms making outward manufacturing
investment should have the labor intensive goods which are mature enough.
Home institutional factors (government support and ownership type) may not
have much effect on on the entry modes for the manufacturing investment. As for
the host institutions, as we explain before, Chinese firms have special advantage
in manufacturing investment because of their long term experience for doing that.
Most of manufacturing investments take place in the less developed countries for
their cheap labor and nature resources. First, Chinese firms are familiar with the
Third World conditions and do not need local partners to provide local
information. Moreover, most of the products are mature enough without new
technology, thus it is not necessary for Chinese firms to have joint venture with
local firms for technology learning or collaboration. Thus, it is quite different
from R&D and market-seeking investment type. Chinese firms when investing in
manufacturing are more likely to choose wholly-owned subsidiary and hold the
whole control rights to increase the flexibility in the foreign market. When the
institutional quality is high and cultural distance is low, the only thing the firms
need to do is to take advantage of the cheap resources and making mass
production in a good environment. Therefore, we propose that when there is high
institutional quality and low cultural distance, Chinese firms more likely to
choose WOS than JV.
Hypothesis 16: The higher institutional quality a host country has, the more
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favorable the internalizing modes (wholly owned subsidiaries) are as opposed to
the externalizing modes (joint ventures) for the firms are making manufacturing
investment.
Hypothesis 17: The lower cultural distances there is between the host
country and home, the more favorable the internalizing modes (wholly owned
subsidiaries) are as opposed to the externalizing modes (joint ventures) for the
firms are making manufacturing investment.
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CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this part is to introduce the research methodologies used in
this study. In this part, we present quantitative method. Quantitative research
emphasizes the measurement and analysis of causal relationships between
variables (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). The first part introduces the sample and
questionnaire design. We conducted a questionnaire survey in mainland China in
2010. The second part introduces the measures for the variables.
4.1 The Survey and Questionnaire Design
The data on firms' foreign market entry mode and their home institutional
factors are collected through a survey of mainland Chinese firms. A major
multinational research company was commissioned to conduct the survey using
its proprietary panel of executives from 1,500 Chinese companies that had some
international businesses in 2010. These companies come from four major
manufacturing sectors, i.e. food and beverages, textile and apparel, electric
machinery and electronics, and transportation and other equipment. Firms from
sectors in natural resources, finance, banking, and business services were
excluded because their outward FDI often reflects government agenda rather than
firm behavior.
The lack of generalizability may happen as a result of coverage bias,
selection bias, and non-response bias. Thus, generalizability of resultant findings
to represent the population it represents is taken into consideration in sample
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design. Blair and Zinkhan (2006) suggest that, instead of attempting to justify the
results by comparing non-respondents with the broader population on a few
demographic variables, or by comparing early versus late respondents,
researchers are encouraged to maximize response rates as much as possible
through careful survey design. The best practices to maximize response rate
involves (1) preparing attractive questionnaire and cover letter, (2) identifying
proper respondents, (3) contacting with proper respondents to inform the coming
survey, (4) following up, and finally, (5) if the respondent rate is still low, doing
extra efforts to compare non-respondent sample with respondent sample,
checking if any differences exists between these two samples on demographic
aspects or key attributes (Blair & Zinkhan, 2006; Dillman, 2000).
To minimize the effects of common method variance, the procedures
suggested by Podsakoff, Mackenzie, and Lee (2003) are followed to design the
questionnaire. Firstly, we carefully construct the items in English and then
translate them into Chinese to make them as simple, specific and concise as
possible. Comprehension problems caused by item complexity or ambiguity
induce respondents to develop their own idiosyncratic meanings for items, which
may result in common method bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Lee, 2003;
Tourangeau, Rasinski, & D’ Andrade, 1991). Item wording and terminology in
Chinese were refined accordingly to ensure the validity and appropriateness of
the measures in China context. Moreover, scale anchors for different constructs
vary from one to another (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Lee, 2003). For some
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constructs in our study (e.g. government support), the scale is consisting of
7-point Likert-type indicators, ranging from 0 “none” to 6 “much more”.
However, some other constructs adopt different anchors for scales. For example,
the scale of product standardization consists in 7-point Likert-type indicators,
ranging from 1 “strongly disagree” to 7 “strongly agree”. At last, respondents
were convinced in advance about the following messages. (1) The information
collected is only for academic usage. (2) There is no right or wrong answer. What
respondents need to do is to answer questionnaires as honestly as possible. (3)
Respondent anonymity is protected.
The questionnaires were delivered to the top executives at these companies
who were familiar with their international operations. After two weeks, follow-up
phone calls and email reminders were to those panelists who have not responded.
Finally, 314 completed questionnaires were collected, resulting in a response rate
of 21%. At the end of the survey, research assistants placed phone calls to 10% of
respondents randomly to verify their identity and responses to the survey. The
data about the host country's national institutions are collected through PRS
Group’s International Country’s Risk Guide (www.prsgroup.com), which
provides measures of a country’s institutional quality (Dikova et al. 2010). The
political risk of PRS Group is measured by 12 items, i.e. government stability,
socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal conflict, external conflict,
corruption, military in politics, religious tension, law and order, ethnic tensions,
democratic accountability, and bureaucracy quality.
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4.2 Measures
4.2.1 Dependent Variable
We use the entry mode as dependent variable. In part one, we focus on
non-equity modes (export) vs. equity modes (FDI, including WOS and JV). If a
firm adopts FDI modes when entering a foreign market, it is denoted as 1, while
the export mode is denoted as 0. A particular company in foreign market may have
two alternatives: export or equity mode, we just use equity mode as the dependent
variable. Since a particular subsidiary may choose both export and equity mode in one
market during a certain time, we specified in the questionnaire that the firm should

indicate its latest investment mode choice if it is in this case. In part two, we
focus on high equity mode (wholly-owned subsidiary) vs. low equity mode (joint
venture) for FDI. If a firm adopts wholly-owned subsidiary when entering a
foreign market in a specific investment type, it is denoted as 1, while the joint
venture mode is denoted as 0.

4.2.2 Government Support
Then, the host and home country institutional factors are the independent
variables. Home government support and ownership type are the indicators of
home institutional factors. Governmental support is measured by five indicators:
(1) Chinese government drew up a series of policies encouraging us to explore
overseas markets; (2) Chinese government helped negotiating with host country
governments when we encountered problems in overseas markets; (3) Chinese
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government helps us to realize our goal in the host country through developing
close relationships with local governments; (4) Chinese government helps us find
appropriate projects in overseas markets; (5) Chinese government puts in place
relevant policies to help us obtain financing with favorable terms for our
overseas expansion. These items are measured in 7-Likert scale with 1 denoting
the lowest and 7 the highest with a point of neutrality in the middle. The five
items then are analyzed through factor analysis and achieve good conceptual
validity. The resulting factor score is used to represent home government support.
As for ownership type, SOEs with the government as the sole or the largest
owner are denoted by 1 while private firms of various types are coded as 0.

4.2.3 Ownership Type
Ownership type is measured using a single item. The respondents were asked
to indicate the type of ownership of the firms, whether they are state-owned,
collectively owned, privately owned, Hong Kong-, Macro- and Taiwan-invested,
or foreign invested. We then grouped collectively owned, privately owned, Hong
Kong-, Macro- and Taiwan-invested, and foreign invested ones into one category,
non-state owned. We coded state-owned firms as 1 and non-state owned as 0.

4.2.4 Institutional Quality
The host institutional factors include institutional quality and cultural
distance. Institutional quality is measured using the data from the PRS Group
International Country Risk Guide (Dikova et al. 2010). This guide measures the
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composite country risks for foreign businesses, including both economic and
politic risks. For the 25 countries in our study, we use their average score of 74 as
the boundary. Countries with a risk score higher than 74 are deemed to have a
good institutional quality and vice versa.

4.2.5 Cultural Distance
Cultural distance is measured by Hofstede’s five culture dimension scores:
power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance and long-term
orientation (Hofstede 2001). Using these index scores can help avoid the
problems of common method variance or retrospective evaluation of a national
culture, which are often attributed to the same individuals answering questions
about firm performance as well as those about national cultures. In this study, we
use the multidimensional measure to arrive at the cultural distance between
China and the other countries along Hofstede's five indices of cultural differences
(Morosini et al. 1998):
CDJ 
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where CDj denotes the cultural distance for the jth country, Iij denotes
Hofstede's culture score on ith cultural dimension in the jth country, and c in this
case denotes the home country of China.

4.2.6 Control Variables
The control variables include industry category, firm age and firm size. We
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include the dummy variables of three industries: 1) electric equipment and
electronics, 2) food and beverages, and 3) textile and apparel (vs. others). Firm
age is measured as the number of years since the beginning of its operations,
while firm size is measured by the total number of employees.
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CHAPTER 5. RESULTS

Among the respondent firms, 52% of them are state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) while the rest of them are various types of private firms. Most of the
firms come from manufacturing industries in electric and electronics (31.9%),
machinery (14.6%), and textile and apparel (11.5%), with the remainder coming
from other sectors. The number of employees among these firms ranges from 100
to more than 100,000, thus representing firms of various sizes. On average, these
firms have 33.2% of total sales from export, 23.9% of total sales from overseas
subsidiaries (excluding export), and 25.6% of their total assets from overseas
divisions. These companies' international business operations cover 25 host
countries in different parts of the world. Altogether, they include 2,373 export
entry modes and 1,071 cases of equity-based investment. Among 2,373 export
cases, 50.4% of them are SOEs, and among 1,071 FDI cases, 54.7% are SOEs
(Table 5). Table 6 includes the descriptive statistics and correlations of the key
variables. Table 7 indicates the categorical variables.
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Table 5 Investment type for SOEs
SOE
Investment Type

Non-SOE

Export Count

1178

% within SOE
FDI
Total

49.6%

Count

485

% within SOE

SOE

Total

1195

2373

50.4%

100%

586

1071

45.3%

54.7%

100%

Count

1663

1781

3444

% within SOE

48%

52%

100%

Table 6 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Variables
SD
.46

1

2

3

4

5

6

1. Entry mode

Mean
.31

2. Govern support
3. Ownership type
4.Institutional quality
5. Cultural distance
6. Firm size
7. Firm age

4.27
1.72
72.30
91.92
3.69
10.74

1.01
.79
14.08
30.27
1.19
14.86

.092**
-.025
-.017
-.051**
-.002
.023

-.101**
.000
.039**
.102
.033**

.000
-.024
.139**
-.282

.392**
.000
.000

.003
.200**

.337

Note: *: p≤0.10, **: p≤0.05 and ***: p≤0.001
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Table 7 Categorical Variables Codings

Frequency
Firm
size

100－499 人

31

500－999 人

207

1000-4999 人

187

5000-9999 人

39

10000－49999 人

25

50000－99999 人

11

10 万人以上

13

Industry Food

96

Textile&Apparel

113

Machinery

140

Transport&Comm
u
Electronic
Electric

&

26
138

5.1 Main Effects of Institutional Factors
Using binary logistic regression with equity modes denoted by 1 and export
denoted by 0, we first test the main effects of the host and home institutional
factors on firms' probability to adopt the equity-based entry modes (JVs and
WOS). The results of the main effects of variables are shown under Model 1 of
Table 8. For the host country institutional factors, institutional quality has a
significant positive effect on the equity mode (β=0.072, p≤0.001). This suggests
that the higher institutional quality in the host country, the more likely are firms
to adopt the equity modes (FDI). As expected, cultural distance has a small and
significant negative effect on the equity entry mode (β= –0.010 p≤0.001). Thus,
the smaller cultural distance there is between China and the host countries, the
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more likely are firms to adopt the equity mode. For the home institutional factors,
government support has a significant positive impact on the choice of equity
modes among Chinese multinationals (β=0.650, p≤0.001). Meanwhile,
ownership type firms (i.e., SOEs) also has a significant positive effect on the
equity mode of entry (β=0.126, p≤0.1). Thus, the SOEs are more likely to adopt
the equity modes (FDI) than private firms.
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Table 8 Results of Logistic Regressions on the Choice of Equity Entry Modes
Variables/Models
Control Variables
Firm size(1)
Firm size(2)
Firm size(3)
Firm size(4)
Firm size(5)
Firm size(6)
Industry (1)
Industry (2)
Industry (3)
Industry (4)
Firm age
Host institutional factors
Institutional quality (IQ)
Cultural distance (CD)
Home institutional factors
Government support (GS)
Ownership type (OT: SOE)
Interactions
IQ*GS
CD*GS
IQ*OT
CD*OT

Model 1
-0.763**
0.104
-0.131
0.024
-0.214
1.304***
0.151
0.094
-0.569***
0.007
0.002
0.072***
−0.010***
0.650***
0.126*

Model 2
−0.756**
0.105
-0.130
0.024
-0.213
1.300***
0.148
0.092
-0.569***
0.005
0.002
0.392**
-0.587***
0.249
-0.022
0.481**
0.053
0.305*
-0.167

Note: *: p≤0.10, **: p≤0.05 and ***: p≤0.001
5.2 Moderating Effects of Home Institutional Factors
To examine the interactive effects among variables, we first conducted the
collinearity diagnostics. The collinearity analysis shows that the variance
inflation factor (VIF) values of variables range between 1.013 and 1.445, thus far
below the critical value of 10, and show no problems with multi-collinearity
among these variables. According to the results of model 2 in Table 8, the main
effects of government support and ownership type are no longer significant once
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the interactions of institutional factors are included. Thus, hypothesis 3 & 4 are
no longer supported. This is perhaps because government support and ownership
type alone do not have a significant influence on the entry modes choice.
However, the main effects of institutional quality, cultural distance remain
significant, thus furnishing support of hypotheses 1 and 2 (Table 8).
Furthermore, from model 2 and the interaction plots (Figure2, 3, 4, 5), home
government support has a significant interaction with host institutional quality in
its effect the equity entry mode (β for IQ*GS = 0.481). Thus, the positive effect
of institutional quality on the probability to adopt the equity modes is greater for
firms with strong home government support than those lacking such support, thus
H5 is supported. But the interaction effect between cultural distance and
government support is not significant. This indicates that home government
support can not significantly mitigate the negative effect of cultural distance on
firms' probability to adopt the equity modes in foreign market entry. In other
words, despite there is strong home government support, the cultural distance
between China and the host country remains a barrier for firms adopting the
equity modes (FDI), H6 is not supported (Figure3). This maybe because that
China is a country with deep cultural background, the cultural difference is a
very important factor when choosing entry modes for Chinese firms. The cultural
distance is always a barrier for equity modes choice even the government would
share the firms’ risk.
Moreover, the interaction between institutional quality and ownership type is
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also significant (β for IQ*OT = .305), supporting H7 and suggesting that SOEs
tend to adopt the equity mode of entry when expanding in countries with a high
level of institutional quality. However, the interaction between cultural distance
and ownership type are not significant, thus H8 is not supported (Figure 5). This
may be due to the fact that there is no significant difference between SOEs and
private firms in the effect of cultural distance on the entry mode decisions or
cultural distance affects their entry mode decisions in a similar way.

Figure 2

Figure 3

Figure 4

Figure 5
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5.3 Main Effects of Investment Type
Using binary logistic regression with wholly-owned subsidiary denoted by 1
and joint venture denoted by 0, we first test the main effects of investment type
(R&D investment, market-seeking investment and manufacturing investment) on
firms' probability to adopt the wholly-owned subsidiary mode. The results of the
main effects of variables are shown under the first model in Table 9. For the
R&D investment type, it has a significant positive effect on the WOS mode
(β=0.481, p≤0.05). This suggests that firms making R&D investment are more
likely to adopt the WOS mode. As expected, manufacturing investment also has a
significant positive effect on the WOS mode (β=0.893, p≤0.001). Thus, firms
making manufacturing investment are more likely to adopt WOS mode as well.
However, for the market-seeking investment, there is no significant effect on the
choice of JV mode, but has the right direction. H9a and H9c are supported but
H9b is not.
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Table 9 Results of Logistic Regressions on the Choice of WOS (Main Effects)
Variables/Models

R&D Investment

Control Variables
Firm size(1)
-0.181
Firm size(2)
-0.552
Firm size(3)
-0.360
Firm size(4)
-0.113
Firm size(5)
-0.664
Firm size(6)
0.115
Industry (1)
0.009
Industry (2)
0.177
Industry (3)
-0.320
Industry (4)
0.416**
Firm age
-0.005
Investment Type
R&D (RD)
0.481**
Market-seeking (MS)
-0.106
Manufacturing (MF)
0.893***
Note: *: p≤0.10, **: p≤0.05 and ***: p≤0.001
Table 10 Results of Logistic Regressions on the Choice of WOS (R&D
Investment)
Variables/Models

R&D Investment

Control Variables
Firm size(1)
0.314
Firm size(2)
-0.228
Firm size(3)
0.327
Firm size(4)
-0.304
Firm size(5)
1.982**
Firm size(6)
1.207
Industry (1)
0.034
Industry (2)
-0.538*
Industry (3)
-0.382
Industry (4)
-0.536
Firm age
0.009
Host institutional factors
Institutional quality (IQ)
-0.063**
Cultural distance (CD)
0.002
Home institutional factors
Government support (GS)
0.080
Ownership type (OT: SOE)
-0.995***
Note: *: p≤0.10, **: p≤0.05 and ***: p≤0.001
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Table 11 Results of Logistic Regressions on the Choice of WOS
(Market-seeking and Manufacturing)
Variables/Models

Market-seeking
Investment

Control Variables
Firm size(1)
0.529
Firm size(2)
0.578
Firm size(3)
1.541**
Firm size(4)
1.034*
Firm size(5)
1.587
Firm size(6)
1.293*
Industry (1)
-0.388
Industry (2)
-0.423
Industry (3)
-0.254
Industry (4)
-0.755
Firm age
-0.003
Host institutional factors
Institutional quality (IQ)
-0.059***
Cultural distance (CD)
0.001
Home institutional factors
Government Support (GS)
0.895**
Ownership Type (OT: SOE)
-0.766***
Note: *: p≤0.10, **: p≤0.05 and ***: p≤0.001

Manufacturing
Investment
-0.782 *
-0.907**
-0.427
-0.867
-0.192
0.112
-0.089
0.063
-0.568**
-0.483
-0.002
0.028 *
0.005 *
0.201
-0.127

5.4 Effects of Institutional Factors in a Certain Investment Type
To examine the interactive effects among variables, we first conducted the
collinearity diagnostics. The collinearity analysis shows that the variance
inflation factors (VIF) values of variables range between 1.018and 1.155, thus far
below the critical value of 10, and show no problems with multi-collinearity
among these variables. For the location choice in a certain investment type using
the data of Chinese multinationals, we find the results (Table 12-14) are not quite
consistent with Buckley’s location framework in table 4:

82

Table 12 OFDI in R&D by Country Type from Chinese Multinationals
Country Type
Developed Countries

Newly Industrialized
Economies
Less Developed Countries

Total
Chi-square sig. < 0.1

Count
% within OFDI in
R&D
Count
% within OFDI in
R&D
Count
% within OFDI in
R&D
Count
% within OFDI in
R&D

OFDI in R&D
no
yes
Total
262
207
469
44.9% 48.4% 46.4%
133
112
245
22.8% 26.2% 24.2%
188
109
297
32.2% 25.5% 29.4%
583
428
1011
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Table 13 OFDI in Marketing by Country Type from Chinese
Multinationals

Country Type
Developed Countries
Newly Industrialized
Economies
Less Developed
Countries
Total
Chi-square sig. 0.884

Count
% within OFDI in Marketing
Count
% within OFDI in Marketing
Count
% within OFDI in Marketing
Count
% within OFDI in Marketing
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OFDI in
Marketing
no
yes
217
252
45.1% 46.3%
115
131
23.9% 24.1%
149
161
31.0% 29.6%
481
544
100.0% 100.0%

Total
469
45.8%
246
24.0%
310
30.2%
1025
100.0%

Table 14 OFDI in Production by Country Type from Chinese Multinationals

Country Type
Developed Countries
Newly Industrialized
Economies
Less Developed
Countries
Total
Chi-square sig. < 0.1

Count
% within OFDI in Production
Count
% within OFDI in Production
Count
% within OFDI in Production
Count
% within OFDI in Production

OFDI in
Production
no
yes
242
229
48.0% 44.6%
129
117
25.6% 22.8%
133
167
26.4% 32.6%
504
513
100.0% 100.0%

Total
471
46.3%
246
24.2%
300
29.5%
1017
100.0%

For the R&D investment type, according to the results in Table 10,
ownership type significantly has effect on the WOS entry mode choice for firms
making R&D investment (β= -0.995). Thus, the negative effect shows that the
probability to adopt the joint venture mode is greater for firms making R&D
investment for SOEs than private firms, thus H11 is supported. But it’s not
significant for the interaction effect between R&D investment type and
government support. This indicates that there is no tendency for firms making
R&D investment to adopt the joint venture mode in foreign market, even though
the government could share the risk with them. It may be caused by technology
collaboration, information approaching or other factors. H10 is not supported.
Moreover, the interaction between institutional quality and R&D investment type
is significant (β=-0.063), supporting H12 and suggesting that firms making R&D
investment tend to adopt the joint venture mode of entry when expanding in
countries with a high level of institutional quality. However, the interaction
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between cultural distance and R&D investment type is not significant, thus H13
is not supported. Cultural distance is still a barrier for the modes choice in R&D
investment.
For the market-seeking investment type, also according to the results in
Table 11, we only focus on the interaction effect between host institutional
factors and the market-seeking type on the WOS mode choice, the interaction
between institutional quality and market-seeking investment type is significant
(β=-0.059), supporting H14 and suggesting that firms making market-seeking
investment tend to adopt the joint venture mode of entry when expanding in
countries with a high level of institutional quality as well as firms making R&D
investment.

However,

the

interaction

between

cultural

distance

and

market-seeking investment type remains not significant, thus H15 is not
supported.
At last, for the manufacturing investment (Table 11), as expected, the
interaction between institutional quality and manufacturing investment type is
significant (β=0.028), supporting H16. The positive relationship suggest that
firms making manufacturing investment tend to adopt the wholly-owned
subsidiary mode of entry when expanding in countries with a high level of
institutional quality. However, the effect of cultural distance has the opposite
direction as expected, H17 is not supported.
The results of all the Hypotheses are summarized in Table 15:
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Table 15: The Results of Hypotheses Testing
Hypothesis

Result

H1 (IQ)

Supported

H2 (CD)

Supported

H3 (GS)

Not Supported

H4 (OT)

Not Supported

H5 (IQ*GS)

Supported

H6 (CD*GS)

Not Supported

H7 (IQ*OT)

Supported

H8 (CD*OT)

Not Supported

H9a (RD)

Supported

H9b (MA)

Not Supported

H9c (MF)

Supported

H10 (RD*GS)

Not Supported

H11 (RD*OT)

Supported

H12 (RD*IQ)

Supported

H13 (RD*CD)

Not Supported

H14 (MA*IQ)

Supported

H15 (MA*CD)

Not Supported

H16 (MF*IQ)

Supported

H17 (MF*CD)

Not Supported
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CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION
6.1 Findings and Conclusions
In perspective of some traditional theories, as transaction cost theory, we
found that it’s difficult to explain some strategy choice of internationalization for
Chinese MNCs. In China, aside from the host country environment, home
country institutional factors such as government support and ownership type are
critical factors in the outward movement of Chinese multinationals. State-owned
enterprises from these countries are more inclined to take challenges of investing
directly in unfamiliar institutional environment than private firms. Government
support and their ownership type offer SOEs significant advantages in their
overseas expansion. The effect of government support is even greater when firms
enter countries with high institutional quality and greater cultural distance. Thus,
different from multinationals from advanced economies, the home country
institutions may play an important role in the internationalization of EMMNCs
and moderate the effects of host country institutional factors on the entry modes
of firms. Governments from emerging market economies can strategically
support firms' expansion in certain country markets when they pursue important
opportunities or assets overseas. More importantly, the results of our study
suggest that the home government support and ownership type alone do not
affect the entry mode of firms in a significant way. Government support at home
by itself and the state-owned status alone would not propel firms to engage in
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foreign direct investment, but only interact with the host institutional factors.
Therefore, we emphasize the role of home institutional factors in affecting firms’
perceptions and tolerance of risks.
Moreover, cultural distance remains a significant barrier for EMMNCs to
invest directly in foreign markets, which is true for both SOEs and private firms
from the emerging market of China. SOEs are more likely to adopt the equity
mode than private firms, especially when expanding in countries of high
institutional quality. But with home government support, firms are more likely to
adopt the equity or FDI mode in markets of high institutional quality and great
cultural distance. Meanwhile, ownership type alone do not affect the entry mode
of firms in a significant way.
At last, in addition to the institutional factors, the investment type also have
significant influence on the equity mode choice between WOS and JV. Firms
making R&D investment are more likely to choose the high equity mode (WOS)
to protect the specific asset. This is quite consistent with the transaction cost
theory. Particularly, the institutional factors also have influence on the entry
modes in a certain investment type (R&D, Market-seeking and Manufacturing).
The effect of institutional factors on equity modes would vary by the investment
types. However, the host institutional factors are more import than the home
institutional factors, especially for market-seeking and manufacturing investment
types.
Thus, different from multinationals from advanced economies, the home
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country institutions may play an important role in the internationalization of
EMMNCs. These findings on the effect of home country institutional factors on
the outward entry modes choice shed some new light on entry mode choice of
firms from less developed countries and call for more empirical studies of
outward internationalization of EMMNCs.
6.2 Implications
The present study contributes to both theoretical and practical implications
on the

internationalization of firms. Theoretically, this research provides

several important contributions to our understanding of institutional factors and
investment types with respect to entry modes. First, we look on the impacts of
institutions on internationalization from a rapidly developing country’s view,
which is different from the previous studies that focus on developed countries,
and different from some studies also focusing on developing countries (Bruton,
Ahlstrom & Puky, 2009). Unlike other developing countries, China is a rapidly
developing country and most of China’s firms have finished the first stage of
internationalization, i.e. inward internationalization and are beginning to
implement outward internationalization. This is suitable to central government’s
policies as can be seen in many significant meetings held by China’s central
government and Chinese Communist Party. So government support is an
important index measuring the institutional differences among firms of various
entry modes. Second, we examine the effects of dual institutions on entry modes,
which are often neglected by the previous studies. Interestingly, home country’s
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institutions and the host country’s institutions appear to influence foreign
subsidiaries in opposite directions, which confirm the institutional theory of two
institutional mechanisms: isomorphism and distinctiveness (DiMaggio & Powell,
1983; Hannan & Freeman, 1977). Finally, our research shows that for developing
countries like China, decision making of R&D investment and market-seeking
investment also have interaction effect with the institutional factors.
Practically, the findings of this study have meaningful implications for
government on public policy making and for firms on strategy development and
their internationalization endeavors. The Chinese Government has long realized
that outward internationalization is important to inward FDI. To some extent, this
study provides support the government policy of going out”, in that government
can play a critical role in promoting outward activities and internationalization.
By developing more promotion for outward activities to satisfy the technology
and market needs of Chinese firms. It may be necessary for the upper level
management of Chinese firms to think more strategically and effectively about
the role of outward activities in the internationalization process.
6.3. Limitations and Future Studies
This research considers how dual institutions influence the entry mode
decisions in light of investment types from the perspective of developing country
firms. Although we focus on China’s MNCs, we can offer some insight into the
effect of home country institutional factors under similar conditions, shed some
new light on entry mode choice of firms from less developed countries, and call
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for more empirical studies of outward internationalization of EMMNCs.
Meanwhile, there are some unavoidable limitations for this study. First, it is
limited to the data from only one home country and may not be apply to firms
from other emerging market economies. The sampled firms are relatively small
in comparison with large state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In China, small- and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) receive less support from the central
government and are also less subject to the influence of government agenda. The
relatively small size of the sampled firms may affect the significance of the
results. Moreover, we did not take institutional changes into consideration. Since
EMMNCs have long operated in complex institutional environments, institutions
changes may affect their internationalization efforts as time passes by.
Future research can include firms from other emerging market economies,
test these hypotheses in other country environments, and provide more
convincing evidence on the effect of home institutional factors on the entry
modes choice of multinationals from less developed economies. It is also
necessary to compare the motivations and internationalization patterns of SMEs
with those of SOEs. Future studies should adopt a longitudinal approach and
explore the impact of changing institutions at home on the internationalization of
firms from emerging market countries. The effects of these home and host
institutional factors on the management strategies and performance of these
EMMNCs in overseas markets of different institutional environments also
warrant systematic investigation.
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Appendix A

Related Questions in the Questionnaire

Section 1 General Information
1. Your Company Name:
2. Company Location: Province:

City:

3.
Your
Position/Title:
*Please check the level of management position you are in:
1) Top Level
2) Middle Level
4. Number of years you have worked at this company: ________ years.
5. Telephone:
(Please be assured that you will not be contacted again
for more questions. Your phone number is requested to confirm a very
small number of randomly selected participants ONLY.)

Instruction for Completing the Questionnaire

Please read the questions carefully and follow the instructions when
answering the questions. We define “outward activities” as “firms start
with no regular export activities, begin to export via agents, and then
establish their own foreign sales subsidiaries,
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and

finally

move

to

production by investing in foreign market.

Section 2 General Information about Your Company
Please note that the following “company” means the parent firm. It doesn’t
matter if you don’t work in the parent firm because what I need is the
related information you provide.
1. What is the legal character of your company? Please check only one
answer.
1. State-Owned Enterprises

7.Other Other

Collective-Owned Enterprises
2. Collective Enterprise

8. Wholly State-Owned

Enterprises
3. Joint-Equity Enterprises

9. Limited Liability Company

in other forms
4. Joint State-State Enterprise

10. Company Limited by

shares
5. Collective Joint Ownership Enterprises

11. Privately-Owned

Enterprises
6. Joint State-Collective Ownership Enterprises

12. Other Domestic-Funded

Enterprises
2. How many full-time employees does your company totally have now?
Employees
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1）1－99
2）100－499
3）500－999
4）1000-4999
10000－49999
7）50000－99999
8）more than 100000

5) 5000-9999

6）

3. When was your company started?
Year
4. Which industry is your company’s primary business activity? Please
circle only one answer.
1. Mining and Forestry
2. Manufacture of foods
3. Beverage Manufacturing
4. Tobacco processing
5. Textiles
6. Clothing and Other Fibred Products
7. Leather, Fur, and Feather (Down) Products
8. Wood Processing and Bamboo, Rattan, and Straw Products
9. Furniture manufacturing
10. Paper manufacturing and Paper Products
11. Educational and Sports Products Manufacturing
12. Oil Processing and coking
13. Chemical Raw Material and Chemical Products
14. Medicine Manufacturing
15. Chemical Fibres Manufacturing
16. Rubber Products
17. Plastic Products
18. Non-metal Mineral Products
19. Ferrous Metals Smelting & Rolling Processing
20. Metal Products
21. General Machinery Manufacturing
22. Special Equipment Manufacturing
23. Transportation Equipment Manufacturing
24. Electrical Machinery and Equipment
25. Electronic and Communication Equipment
26. Instruments, Meters, Educational and Office Equipment
27. Othe

5. So far, what kinds of outward activities does your company have? Please
check all the answers that apply to your company.
A. Exporting.
B. Franchising.
C. Licensing.
D. Establishing the oversea sales department
E. Joint Venture in oversea markets.
F. Wholly owned foreign investment. (Merge and Acquisition) .
G.. Wholly owned foreign investment. (Greenfield).
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H. Setting up oversea manufacturing or operation.
6. Compared to other companies in the same industry, to what extent, your
company has engaged in “outward activities”? Please evaluate using a
7-point scale.
Pleas
e
note:
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
6.6
6.7
6.8
6.9

1=Much
Less

2=Less 3=A
little
Less

4=Sam 5=A
e
Little
More

Exporting.
Franchising.
Licensing.
Establishing
the
oversea
sales
dJoint V
t enture
t in oversea markets.
Wholly owned foreign investment.
(Merge
Wholly owned foreign investment.
(Greenfield)
Setting up oversea manufacturing or
operation.
Compared with top competitors, we
have
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6=More

7=Much
More

1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5
5
5

6
6
6
6
6
6

7
7
7
7
7
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

7. until 2009, in which country or district your company has taken “outward activities”? Please tick all the answers that apply to your
company.
Export
Entry Modes
Countries

1
Asian

2
Africa

3
Europe

Direct
Export

Establis
hing the
Oversea
Sales
Depart
ment

FDI

Contracting

Manuf
acturi
ng
Contr
act

Techn
ology
Contr
act

Sal
es
Co
ntra
ct

modes
Wholly
Owned
Subsidiar
y

1.1 Japan
1.2 Korea
1.3Hong Kong
1.4 Singapore
1.5 Vietnam
1.6 India
1.7 Thailand
1.8 Others
2.1 South Africa
2.2 Sudan
2.3 Guinea
2.4 Nigeria
2.5 Madagascar
2.6 Others
3.1 Britain
3.2 Germany
3.3 France
3.4 Russia
3.5 Holland
3.6 Others
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Joint
Venture

Merge
And
Acquisitio
n

Money Amount
(Ten Thousand Dollar)
Oversea
manufactu
ring

0
99

100
999

1000
9999

More than
One hundred
million

4
North
America

4.1 U.S.
4.2 Canada

5
Oceania

6
Latin
America

5.1 Australia
5.2 New Zealand
5.3 Others
6.1 Mexico
6.2 Brazil
6.3 Argentina
6.4 the Bahamas
6.5 Cayman
Islands
6.6 Others
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8. Please indicate your level of agreement/disagreement on the following statement using a
7-point scale.
Please
note:

1=Absolutely
Disagreement

2=Strongly
Disagreement

3=Somewhat
Disagreement

4=Neutral

government
made
11.1 Chinese
policies
to
encourage our company to develop
112 When our company met the entry
barriers
made by host country, Chinese
government would
help
us
to
11.3 Chinese government kept close
relation with host countries to help our
company to
helped our
11.4 Chinese government
company
government
provided
11.5 Chinese
favorable
loan policy to our company to

5=Absolutely
Agreement

6=Strongly
Agreement

7=Somewh
at
Agreement

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

9. What percentage does the foreign sales account for the total sales? (Based on the latest
annual report)
%
10. What percentage do the foreign assets account for the total assets? (Based on the latest
annual report)
%
11. How many countries where your company has subsidiaries? (Based on the latest annual
report)

12. How many foreign countries does your company operate?

13. What percentage do the overseas subsidiaries account for the total subsidiaries? (Based
on the latest annual report)
%
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14. How many oversea manufacturing or operations does your company have among the
oversea subsidiaries?
%

15. How many average years of international experience do top managers in your company
have?
(Please note: TM is defined as the top two tiers of executives, including all chairmen,
presidents, CEOs, and the first level of vice presidents of its equivalent (Wiersema & Bantel,
1992). International Experience is defined as the average number of years the TM members have
spent abroad on assignment and/or in higher education, or in an international division (Sambharya,
1996)
Years (Please Note: The number could be a approximate number)
16. What percentage does the sales from all overseas subsidiaries account for the total sales?
(Based on the latest annual report)
%
17. What percentage does
the productions
from overseas manufacturing account for
the total productions? (Based on the latest annual report)
%
18. How much turn over do your company (including all subsidiaries) have? (Based on the latest
annual report)
RMB

19. How many assets does your company (including all subsidiaries) have? (Based on the latest
annual report)
RMB

Thank you very much for participating in the study!
If you wish to receive a copy of the research report, please kindly leave your mailing or
email address. It will be used only for sending you the report!
Your name: Street Add:
City/Province: Zip Code:
Email:
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